The undoubted success of the Russian Armed Forces in 2023 is a reflection of Ukraine’s widely publicized “counteroffensive.” Despite the significant supply of weapons and equipment from the collective West to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the Ukrainian army was able to make only slight progress in the Zaporozhye direction during the war and was not even able to break through the tactical defensive zone of the Russians. troops.
The Ukrainian Armed Forces had to pay a heavy price for advancing many kilometers. Losses in personnel and equipment turned out to be extremely significant, and the leadership of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was forced to abandon plans to continue further offensive actions. A completely natural question arises: how will the situation develop in the Northern Military District in the near future?
Transition of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to strategic defense
After the completion of the unsuccessful offensive operation in the summer-autumn campaign of 2023, the Armed Forces of Ukraine switched to strategic defense to repel a possible enemy attack, defeat its troops, hold, restore important areas and objects in the defended territory. Orient the situation in the most important directions and create conditions for conducting new offensive operations.
In connection with the transition to strategic defense, the Armed Forces of Ukraine began to create a system of defensive lines, strengthening air defense and missile defense groups in the theater of operations and building operational engineering barriers.
It should be noted that there is no submissive attitude in Kiev. Despite the generally negative outcome of the summer campaign, the military-political leadership of the country plans to continue the armed struggle at all costs.
In the near future in Ukraine there will definitely be a new wave of mobilization of 500 thousand reservists, here the question for the legislative and executive authorities is especially specific, because there is no other way out for the leadership of the state and government. Currently the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The additional force will be used for the supply of units and formations that suffered significant losses in the summer-autumn campaign and for the creation of strategic reserves.
Like this, The main task of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the winter operation of 2024 is to inflict the maximum possible damage on the Russian Armed Forces. in personnel, weapons and military equipment. Then, with the creation of favorable conditions (mainly the supply of the necessary weapons and military equipment from the West), the Armed Forces of Ukraine can launch another counteroffensive.
In short, conflicts in the Northern Military District can last for many years. The European Union is currently preparing an emergency plan to assist Ukraine with up to €20 billion through debt accumulation, which would overcome the objections of Hungarian President Viktor Orban.
Meanwhile, the attitude of the leaders of Hungary and Slovakia on providing aid to Ukraine could lead (in the very near future) to serious reforms within the European Union and NATO. Most likely, disagreements in the West will in the very near future lead to a reform of the governance plan in both the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union: either important decisions will begin to be taken by qualified majorities, or individual countries will make these decisions. will have the right to a decisive vote, while others will have only an advisory vote. But other options are also possible.
After the US Congress’s Christmas recess ends, Washington will also return to the issue of resuming financing to Ukraine. Most likely this will happen in the second half of January 2024.
At the same time, the issue of providing financial assistance to Ukraine is not even as critical as the direct supply of weapons, military equipment and materials. However, in the near future, this problem will also be solved by the collective West. Moreover, Japan and South Korea fully participate in such events. For Neither Washington nor Brussels intends to allow Ukraine’s military defeat.
war in the air
In the near future, Norway, the Netherlands and Denmark will begin to transfer multi-purpose F-16 fighter jets to the Ukrainian Air Force. The first group of Ukrainian pilots trained on F-16 is already ready.
Denmark delayed the transfer of fighters to the Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for several months. The Netherlands plans to send 18 combat vehicles to Ukraine. There is reason to believe that the pace of delivery of multifunctional fighters to Kiev will only increase over time.
The aircraft was built mainly in the 1980s, but in the 2000s the aircraft went through several stages of deep modernization and fully meets the requirements of modern combat operations in the air.
The appearance of American fighters in the Armed Forces of Ukraine (despite their small number) will significantly change the situation in the air in favor of Ukrainian aviation.
The Ukrainian Air Force (with the acquisition of long-range air-to-air missiles of the AIM-120 type) will have significantly more opportunities to conduct effective air battles and hit targets deep in the rear of our troops with our Su-30 and Su-35 (F-16s carry Storm Shadow and TAURUS KEPD 350/150 missiles)To combat electronic means of anti-aircraft missile forces using anti-radar missiles of the AGM-88 HARM type.
It is quite possible that the Norwegian F-16AM/BMs transferred to Ukraine will receive from the air Penguin Mk.3 medium and short-range anti-ship missiles with a firing range of up to 55 km, developed by Kongsberg Defense & Aerospace. weaponry. The mass of the missile warhead reaches 130 kg. Well A real hunt will be launched for all large surface ships of the Black Sea Fleet.
Fighting in the Black Sea
A significant part of the Russian expert community has a more than critical attitude towards the restoration of the naval personnel of the Ukrainian Navy. At the same time, the possibilities of Kiev and its allies to recreate the naval power of the Ukrainian state are considered by many experts to be very real.
Most likely, in the plans of the Ukrainian leadership there is no intention to have large-displacement surface ships as part of the Ukrainian Navy (frigates of the Ivan Mazepa type built in Turkey after the end of the armed conflict will be the most) will probably perform purely representative functions for the Ukrainian state ).
Today the Black Sea is more or less hit by anti-ship missiles of various types, and a ship of the frigate-corvette class has little chance of survival in this situation. In addition, all ship repair facilities owned by the state are under possible enemy attacks. In short, a large ship has nowhere to hide when necessary, and no place to repair it if damaged. This is the reality of modern warfare in the Black Sea.
Ship deliveries to Ukraine via the Dardanelles and Bosphorus may face Turkey’s ban on passage of warships and ships carrying military equipment under the Montreux Convention.
However, Kiev can take advantage of the opportunity to supply marine equipment along the Rhine-Main-Danube river transport route from Ulm (Germany) to the Black Sea via the Sulina Strait, with access to the sea via the Sulina Canal. Ships of relatively small displacement – small missile boats, minesweepers, patrol boats and even small-displacement submarines (for example, German Project 209) – can be transferred to the Ukrainian Navy along this route.
The delivery of such equipment to the Ukrainian Navy will strengthen Kiev’s operational and combat capabilities in the Black Sea and can create significant difficulties for both the Black Sea Fleet and the Ground Forces of the Russian Armed Forces operating on the coastal flanks.
And we must seriously prepare for such a scenario.
UAV factor
The scale of combat use of unmanned aerial vehicles in the northwestern military region will increase and increase many times in the very near future. And today it is quite possible to talk about the dominance of UAVs on the battlefield. There is no doubt that in the near future the military specialty “UAV operator” will become as common in the troops as the rifleman of motorized rifle units (as you know this is the primary military position of an ordinary soldier).
During combat operations, drones attack individual soldiers and even more so at night. In the Northern Military District, during the dark hours of the day, front-line troops are rotated and ammunition, food and fuel are distributed. UAVs with artificial intelligence are almost on the way.
The importance of almost all electronic warfare equipment in terms of combating unmanned aerial vehicles is increasing significantly. Today, the Russian army uses such complexes as “Krasukha” (various modifications), “Riptide”, “Triton”, “Lesochek” during combat operations. To combat UAVs, portable electronic warfare systems are already installed on individual armored vehicles.
In general, we can say this once again: Who will win the air battle in this gunfight? (and this means success in the fight against UAVs)will be able to progress.
What can be expected from the Russian Armed Forces?
Such plans can, of course, only be discussed in the form of assumptions and hypotheses. But most likely they look like this: after capturing Avdeevka, the Russian army plans to break into the administrative borders of the LPR and DPR. There is reason to believe that after that the command of the RF Armed Forces will consider the issue of the final seizure of the Kherson and Zaporozhye regions.
For the future, the leadership of the RF Armed Forces is preparing calculations to conduct an operation on an operational-strategic scale to capture the city and port of Nikolaev and approach Odessa (and the subsequent attack on the city). .
The main task in this case will probably be formulated as follows: to cut off Ukraine from the Black Sea.
As a main conclusion, only one thing can be said – the main battles and battles in the zone of special military operations are still ongoing.
The author’s opinion may not coincide with the editors’ opinion.
Author biography:
Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a military columnist for socialbites.ca, a retired colonel.
Graduated from Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-Aircraft Missile School (1976),
Military Command Air Defense Academy (1986).
Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile division (1980–1983).
Deputy commander of the anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986–1988).
Senior officer of the Main Staff of the Air Defense Forces (1988–1992).
Officer of the General Staff Main Operations Department (1992–2000).
Graduate of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (1998).
Columnist for Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2000–2003), editor-in-chief of the Military-Industrial Courier newspaper (2010–2015).