An attempt by the Ukrainian armed forces to move south under the command of Malaya Tokmachka resulted in defeats and losses “worse than it used to appear”. For this reason writer Forbes magazine is about it.
The conflicts in this residential area developed as follows. Initially, several Leopard 2R armored minesweepers (BMRs) and at least one BMR Wisent 1MC were used to cross Russian minefields.
The armored minesweeper Leopard 2R (Raivauspanssarivaunu) was created on the basis of the German Leopard 2A4 tank. This BMR was developed specifically for the Finnish armed forces. In the bow of the hull of this machine, attachment points for hydraulically driven attachments are located, which allows you to attach various bulldozer equipment or minesweepers.
BMR Wisent 1MC is produced by the British company Pearson Engineering. It is believed that this company is the world leader in the production of weapons and military equipment of engineering troops. The Wisent 1 was also developed on the chassis of the Leopard 2 tanks. The BMR is equipped with a wide-winged trawler (FWMP), the so-called “mine plough”. According to the manufacturer, the teeth along the entire width of the BMR are guaranteed to remove mines installed on the ground with camouflage.
However, under the Malaya Tokmachka, everything immediately turned away from what was described in the brochures of these mine-clearing machines.
It turned out that British-made trawlers aboard the Leopard 2R and Wisent armored minesweepers missed a significant amount of anti-tank mines. The BMR was followed by M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles and MaxxPro armored vehicles of the 47th brigade.
Three Leopard 2Rs and Wisent BMRs, like several M2 Bradley BMPs, were almost instantly blown up by unexploded mines at the start of the war. Having entered the minefields and falling under the fire of Russian artillery, the combat group instantly dispersed. The teams jumped from their handicapped vehicles and dragged the dead and injured behind them. The medics on the M2 Bradley picked up the surviving fighters.
“The attempt by the 47th Air Assault Brigade and the 33rd Mechanized Brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to cross a minefield in southern Ukraine on June 8 was more disastrous than we thought. In one to two hours of combat, units of both brigades lost almost a fifth of the American M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, a fifth of the Leopard 2A6 and half of the Leopard 2R, ”writes Forbes.
Some of the Ukrainian armored vehicles were blown up by mines, some came under deadly fire from Russian artillery.
“As the smoke cleared, at least 25 wrecked Ukrainian combat vehicles became visible: 17 M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, four Leopard 2A6 tanks, three Leopard 2R armored minesweepers (BMRs), and one Wisent BMR,” the article says.
The result of an unsuccessful attack was the loss equivalent to one battalion. It will now take weeks or even months to repair damaged armored vehicles. It seems that some combat vehicles will not be able to be put back into service. But the biggest loss is people. According to the smallest estimates, this attack cost the Armed Forces of Ukraine several dozen soldiers and commanders killed.
There is reason to believe that in addition to imported armored mine-clearing vehicles, of which the main share, apparently, was made, the Armed Forces of Ukraine should make crossings in minefields in a purely explosive manner, that is, using demining facilities. Mine clearance fees of type UR-83P and type UZ-ZR.
According to Forbes, if the Ukrainian Armed Forces manages to break through the defense lines of the Russian army in the Rabotino settlement, they will be able to advance to Tokmak, 20 km from Ukraine. South. If the Ukrainian Armed Forces capture Tokmak, they will be able to attack Melitopol, located 60 km of the T0401 highway.
According to the American edition, the RF Armed Forces is well aware of the importance of the Rabotino-Tokmak-Melitopol direction. Two motorized rifle regiments of the Russian army (70th and 291st motorized rifle regiments), along with several special forces brigades and reserve units, have excavated north of Rabotino, and Russian air force helicopter helicopters are patrolling the skies above their positions. Russian minefields in this area are distinguished by an extremely high density (which, of course, was not expected by foreign experts).
And in the engineering equipment of the defense of units and formations, it should be taken into account that one of the main tasks of engineering support is the creation of a system of engineering barriers, which, as you know, is a set of barriers. destruction, combined with natural obstacles and in close coordination with defense systems, lines, fire damage and planned maneuvering of troops.
A minefield is the largest type of mine-explosive obstacle, a piece of land on which mines of one or more types are placed in a certain order or randomly. The most important operational characteristic in this case is the density of obstacles. It is determined separately for anti-tank and anti-personnel (amphibious) minefields. The density of the barriers is defined as the ratio of the total length of the barriers installed to the front width of the covered direction. According to Forbes, TM-62M anti-tank mines in the Malaya Tokmachka area were only “few feet” (less than a meter) apart.
Developed in the 1960s, the TM-62M high-explosive anti-tank mine is the most powerful Soviet tracked anti-tank mine. It can be installed manually or by mechanization. The total mass of the mine is 9.5-10 kg, and the mass of the explosive is 7.5-8 kg. Precision – 200-500 kg.
The old, but by no means good TM-62M gun is guaranteed to disable any equipment that gets into it, from an armored car to a tank. Digging directly under the track or wheel will disable the equipment 100% with no chance of repair. In terms of the number of disabled Ukrainian wheeled and tracked armored vehicles, the TM-62M is the undisputed leader among all other weapons.
In addition, Russian engineering and engineer units and units can also use the TM-89 cumulative high-explosive anti-tank mines, which entered service in 1993. The mine is so powerful that when detonated it can pierce 200mm of rolled armor.
There is also a TM-83 mine in the equipment of the Russian army. It hits enemy armored vehicles not from the bottom, but from the side, where the armor protection is much weaker. These mines are laid on the routes of enemy mechanized units. They camouflage themselves on the roadside.
As for the means of mechanizing the installation of minefields, the Russian army uses the GMZ-3 tracked minelayer in this capacity. It was designed for mechanized anti-tank mining during the war. Mining is carried out on uncamouflaged ground surface or camouflaged ground.
In addition to the GMZ-3, Russian engineering and digger units are actively using the modern engineering system for remote mining “Agriculture”. It is designed to quickly create minefields in particularly dangerous areas at a distance of 5 to 15 km. “Agriculture” fires rockets that allow mines to be placed in a specific area. It is possible to lay minefields of any complexity, including those with passes for friendly troops.
According to Western experts, the density, quality and mastery of minefields was one of the main obstacles to the success of the Ukrainian offensive operation.
At the same time, according to Forbes, the disaster of June 8 slowed but did not stop Ukraine’s counterattack in this sector. In the next package of military aid, the United States promised to provide the Ukrainian Armed Forces with additional M2 Bradley combat vehicles as compensation for losses. But the European allies do not have any additional Leopard 2A6 tanks at this stage. And there are no new Leopard 2R armored minesweepers.
The opinion of the author may not coincide with the opinion of the editors..
Author biography:
Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a military observer of socialbites.ca, a retired colonel.
Graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-aircraft Missile School (1976),
Air Defense Military Command Academy (1986).
Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile battalion (1980–1983).
Deputy commander of an anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986–1988).
Senior officer of the Main Staff of the Air Defense Forces (1988–1992).
Chief of the General Staff Main Operations Directorate (1992–2000).
Graduate of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (1998).
Columnist for Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2000–2003), editor-in-chief of the Military Industrial Courier newspaper (2010–2015).