Currently, units and formations of the RF Armed Forces, as well as irregular formations, continue offensive operations with the aim of finally capturing the city of Bakhmut. In the north-west of the city, fighting continues for Orekhovo-Vasilievka and Bogdanovka. Both settlements are still in enemy hands. The village of Khromovo is still in the hands of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Fighting continues south of Bakhmut, near Krasnoe and west of Kleshcheevka and Kurdyumovka. Hostilities do not subside in the city itself, in the southern part of the industrial zone of the AZOM factory (Artemovsky plant for the processing of non-ferrous metals), not far from the center of Bakhmut, and in the southern quarters of the city.
According to General Alexander Syrsky (in some Russian sources he is referred to as a colonel-general, but after the reform of 2019 there is no such rank in the Armed Forces of Ukraine), the enemy is weakening, and the right time for a counterattack by the forces of the formed groups of the Armed Forces of Ukraine deployed in the Bakhmut region.
In addition, the Ukrainian commander plans to encircle and destroy the irregular formations that attack the city from this direction in the north of Bakhmut.
Usually, a counterattack is launched as soon as the opposing side’s offensive capabilities are exhausted, the nearest reserves are depleted, and command and control is disrupted.
Among other things, the advancing side must seize fire superiority and air superiority in the counterattack zone, at least for a while. These are very simple textbook rules, but it is quite difficult to choose the best moment to launch a counterattack.
Experiment, determine that the enemy’s offensive capabilities are exhausted, when everything around is in smoke and flames, gunfire and small gunfire are heard from all sides, and yet, as usual, incomplete and contradictory reports come from the troops. Here, in addition to accurate intelligence data, you need significant command instinct and foresight. So in this case, the command post should not be a simple officer, but a skilled commander. And the organization and conduct of a counterattack, of course, belongs to the highest levels of military skill.
As for the advancing Russian side, in the case of a well-organized counterattack by the Ukrainian Armed Forces, it will be very difficult for the units and formations of the RF Armed Forces, as well as irregular formations, to come to the defense overnight. Still, defense and offense are slightly different things, to say the least.
For example, the engineering equipment of the defense zone includes the creation of a system of engineering barriers, both mine-explosive and non-explosive.
Mines include explosive minefields, anti-personnel and anti-tank mines. In some cases, minefields are controlled. Non-explosive engineering barriers include wire barriers (including Bruno’s spirals and thin barriers), gouges, hedgehogs, perpendiculars, and struts.
When preparing a defensive operation, all this is set up in front of the leading edge (the next line of defense). And vice versa – during offensive operations in the penetration sectors and in the offensive zones of the troops, all mine-explosive barriers must be removed by the forces of engineering and digging units, and crossings should be made in wire barriers.
But this can significantly facilitate the implementation of a counterattack by the enemy. Some minefields, of course, can be restored by the forces of mobile obstacle detachments, but by no means all and by no means completely. And with a sudden counterattack (and only so) it will not be possible to do this.
Finally, it will be very, very difficult overnight for troops and formations that have been carrying out multiple attacks a day for months. In this case, it is necessary to form the corresponding groups of troops and their operational formations in a completely different way. It is urgently necessary to begin to create a system of defense lines, areas, positions. It is necessary to create a complex fire extinguishing system with new principles and completely different tasks.
This is relatively easy to do when the enemy has been defeated and demoralized during previous offensive battles and operations, and one just needs to consolidate on the obtained lines. But if the enemy has substantial forces, is proactive, cunning and stubborn, and is so eager to counterattack, it is very, very difficult to get on the defensive in such conditions.
Finally, only time is needed, and considerable time, to implement the fortification equipment of the defensive line. For example, at least 12-15 days are required for the full fortification equipment of the defensive zones in a combined arms division, and in the army – 20-22 days.
According to the classics, only the main line of defense includes three or four positions, each with a depth of 2-2.5 km, with a distance of up to 4 km between them. And such lines, as a rule, should be equipped with two plus cutting positions. In other words, it is enough to dig up the soil 10-12 hours a day for days in a row. Of course, it is possible to use mechanization tools, demolition costs, industrial structures and local materials. But with all this, it should be noted that in most cases only a large digger shovel remains the main tool for warriors. And this is hard physical labor, a lot of exhausting staff.
Therefore, it is possible that General Alexander Syrsky, together with his troops, tried to take full advantage of all these favorable conditions for the Armed Forces of Ukraine and inflicted a sudden blow on the Russian units, weakened during previous offensive operations, not protected by engineering barriers. and not yet on the defensive. Therefore, probably, the declared intentions of the Ukrainian command should not be treated as a simple air waving, but should plan its combat work according to all possible scenarios for the development of the situation.
The opinion of the author may not coincide with the opinion of the editors.
Author biography:
Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a military observer of socialbites.ca, a retired colonel.
Graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-aircraft Missile School (1976),
Air Defense Military Command Academy (1986).
Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile battalion (1980–1983).
Deputy commander of an anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986–1988).
Senior officer of the Main Staff of the Air Defense Forces (1988–1992).
Chief of the General Staff Main Operations Directorate (1992–2000).
Graduate of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (1998).
Columnist for Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2000–2003), editor-in-chief of the Military Industrial Courier newspaper (2010–2015).