“We don’t expect to get enough opportunities to plan a decisive counterattack this year. The Ukrainian army does not even have 30% of what is necessary to conduct combat operations. Our main plans will be as early as next year when weapons stockpiles will accumulate, ”says the Financial Times, reporting the words of an unnamed Ukrainian official.
However, it’s not just about the presence/absence of weapons. Representatives of the military-political circles and the Ukrainian expert community have been talking about a counterattack in the Kherson direction (“counter-offensive, as they say in Ukraine”) for several months.
From the point of view of military art, the defeat of the broken enemy groups (in this case, the Russian Armed Forces) should be carried out by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, at least by carrying out a strategic counterattack. Usually it is he who is carried out with the aim of defeating the most dangerous group of enemies that has broken off and restoring the lost position in certain directions.
The most important thing for the successful implementation of a strategic counterattack according to the canons of operational art is the secrecy of its preparation, the surprise of its delivery, the creation of a decisive advantage over the enemy in the chosen directions and the determination of the enemy. movements.
It would be absolutely wrong to say that it is precisely these theoretical provisions that guide the Ukrainian military and politicians today. They trumpet their plans literally “out of every iron”. On the one hand, such actions can be considered a big mistake, on the other hand, it cannot be completely ignored that there is an element of operational camouflage in all this.
Among other things, before launching a counterattack by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, it is necessary to take measures to provide reliable fire damage to the enemy, as well as to protect the advancing and deployed troops from enemy air attacks.
Hymars and Caesars presented to the Armed Forces of Ukraine (despite their very high performance characteristics) are unlikely to perform such tasks due to their small number. But in fact: for the successful implementation of the counterattack of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, several rocket-propelled artillery brigades (50 Hymars and M270 combat vehicles each) and more self-propelled artillery regiments equipped with guns of the PzH2000 type are required.
The formation of groups of the Armed Forces of Ukraine during a hypothetical counterattack should ensure the delivery of the strongest initial strike against the enemy, as well as the development of an offensive to the full depth of the counterattack. To do this, it is necessary to have a sufficiently powerful first echelon with the inclusion of most of the tank formations and formations at the disposal of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. However, at this stage at the disposal of the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine there are not enough forces and means for this.
And it requires at least three to four tank brigades (equipped with Abrams, Leopard, Leclerc tanks) and 4-5 mechanized brigades (on the Bradley and Marder infantry fighting vehicles). So far, the Armed Forces of Ukraine has neither the first nor the second. And it’s not clear in terms of when that might become a reality.
Before the start of the counterattack, it would be good for the Ukrainian armed forces to launch a series of powerful air strikes on enemy targets and troops and gain air superiority at least for a while (and at least in the direction of Kherson). . This requires at least 100-120 F-16 multirole fighters.
In addition, it is necessary to allocate an appropriate flight resource, provided by aviation fuel and aviation weapons (in this case, we are talking about the number of sorties allocated for a counterattack). Such forces and means, in the best case, will be at the disposal of the Ukrainian leadership no earlier than 6-9 months (or even more).
Let’s draw a line. An early counterattack by the Ukrainian armed forces, while the enemy (RF Armed Forces) is not yet weakened, cannot lead Kiev to a definitive conclusion.
Most likely, the case will end with the defeat of the counterattack group of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. This is exactly the situation on the line of communication right now. However, this does not mean that local “countershot” attempts of the Armed Forces of Ukraine will not be carried out. Kiev has no equipment for a counterattack. But they can try.
The author’s view may not coincide with the editors’ position.
Author biography:
Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a military observer of socialbites.ca, a retired colonel.
Graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-aircraft Missile School (1976),
Air Defense Military Command Academy (1986).
Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile battalion (1980–1983).
Deputy commander of an anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986-1988).
Senior officer of the Air Defense Forces Chief of Staff (1988-1992).
Officer of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff (1992-2000).
Graduate of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (1998).
Columnist for Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2000–2003), editor-in-chief of the Military Industrial Courier newspaper (2010–2015).
Source: Gazeta
