The latest mobile launch platform intended for NASA’s heavy-lift SLS vehicle is projected to cost significantly more than initial estimates. Auditors from NASA’s Office of the Inspector General examined the project and flagged substantial budget and schedule risks tied to the ML-2 Mobile Launch Platform built by Bechtel.
The Bechtel-developed platform is designed to support the super-heavy SLS Block 1B rocket, which is slated for lunar missions beginning with Artemis 4. This generation of the rocket measures roughly ten meters longer than its Block 1 predecessor, underscoring the need for a larger, more capable supporting structure.
NASA awarded Bechtel a $383 million contract in June 2019 to design and construct the ML-2, with an initial readiness target of March 2023. The platform is conceived as a large, tracked carrier topped with a long turret to accommodate the rocket and its ground-support equipment.
As of February 2022, Bechtel’s own project estimate placed the total cost at about $960.1 million, more than twice the original contract value. The forecast assumes production would begin in October 2025, followed by over a year of testing and pre-launch preparation before Artemis 4 could be launched from ML-2.
However, the OIG’s review casts doubt on the likelihood of completing the work on time within the allotted budget. Their analysis suggests only a 4% chance that ML-2 would be finished on the initial funding and schedule. With a 70% likelihood, the total program cost could reach about $1.5 billion, and the readiness date could shift to the fall of 2027. Based on the audit, launch readiness for Artemis 4 would not occur until the end of 2028, even though Artemis 4 was planned for a 2027 timeframe.
The audit attributes most of the cost increases and delays to contractor performance challenges, though NASA officials indicate responsibility also lies with NASA for certain scope and planning aspects. The report notes that Bechtel and NASA management concur that the project underestimated the overall scope and complexity when work began on the ML-2, leading to underestimates in equipment, materials, and labor hours. The platform’s tested weight surged from the originally planned 5,400 tons to more than 400 tons by January, a substantial variance that contributes to schedule and funding pressures.
Bechtel disputed the audit conclusions, arguing that the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic were not adequately accounted for in the assessment. The disagreement centers on how external disruptions and supply chain constraints affected the project timeline and cost trajectory.
In brief, the ML-2 initiative illustrates the difficulty of aligning ambitious aerospace development with fixed budgets and aggressive launch timelines. The platform’s size, propagation through an evolving lunar architecture, and the realities of large-scale industrial programs combine to create risk everywhere from design through testing and integration. As NASA and its partners work to keep Artemis on a plausible path to the Moon, accountability, clarity on scope, and realistic milestones remain central to the program’s prospects. Market observers note that responsible cost management and contingency planning will be essential as the mission set evolves and new technical hurdles appear. The ML-2 case also highlights the importance of robust oversight in high-profile government programs and the ongoing challenge of reconciling performance expectations with the practicalities of engineering complex space systems. Cited references: NASA Office of the Inspector General audit and associated program documentation (NASA OIG). Bechtel project disclosures and NASA management statements (Bechtel; NASA).”