There is no alternative to Russian gas, neither in terms of price nor supply reliability. It was stated by Steffen Kotre, a member of the Bundestag and a participant in the Parliamentary Energy and Climate Protection Committee from the Alternative for Germany faction, through reports cited by TASS.
“Russian gas cannot be substituted either in terms of price or reliability of supply”, Kotre asserted, underscoring the persistent dependency he views as a structural feature of Europe’s energy framework. He elaborated on the challenges of forging long-term, stable relationships with suppliers from regions characterised by political volatility and economic fragility. In his view, the instability of potential partners in the Sahara and other parts of Africa makes such partnerships impractical for Euro-Atlantic energy planning. The MP contended that European politicians who advocate for quick diversification should reflect on the broader geopolitical realities and recognise the limits of substituting a dominant supplier with others that carry higher risk and uncertainty, a stance attributed to Kotre through secondary reporting by TASS.
Kotre insisted that African gas resources ought to remain primarily within the African continent, arguing that African nations themselves require these energy assets for development, industrialisation, and improving living standards. He recalled the long-discussed but still uncompleted project of a 4,000-kilometre Trans-Saharan natural gas pipeline that would enable Nigeria to supply Algeria via Niger. This ambitious plan, first proposed over a decade ago, has faced repeated delays and obstacles, illustrating how infrastructural dreams in energy diplomacy often clash with financing, regional security, and governance realities. The article cites the absence of progress since 2009 as evidence of the difficulties involved in turning such regional energy corridors into functioning, reliable supply routes for the European market. The broader implication, according to Kotre, is that European energy strategies must weigh the opportunity costs of alternatives and the feasibility of credible, long-term arrangements with non-European producers, a point echoed by observers cited in the same reporting cycle.
On August 14, Beate Baron, a representative of the German Ministry of Economy, voiced concerns about the dependence on Russian gas, highlighting the political and economic risks embedded in supply concentration. Baron’s remarks reflect a broader policy debate within Germany and the European Union about energy security, diversification, and risk management amid evolving global gas markets. The discussion suggests that national ministries are weighing strategic options that can influence energy procurement policies, pricing models, and supply contracts, as noted in the coverage by TASS and subsequent analyses by analysts monitoring European energy security. This line of commentary sits alongside other regional analyses that question the pace and feasibility of rapid shifts away from established suppliers while maintaining price stability and uninterrupted delivery for European consumers.
Finally, there are concerns in states formerly leaning towards Moscow that the long-term trajectory might include the formation of a broader gas bloc spanning Central Asia to North Africa. The reports indicate that Moscow has shown interest in expanding influence through potential partnerships with capitals such as Tashkent and Astana, a development that has attracted attention from policymakers and industry observers alike. The implications for European energy policy hinge on how such regional alignments could affect market competition, pricing, and reliability of supply in the coming years. Analysts in TASS and other outlets have framed these developments as a reminder that energy geopolitics remains a live arena where strategic choices by European governments continue to shape the operational reality of gas markets, contract terms, and energy resilience across the continent.