Russo-African Trade Shifts Toward Friendly Currencies and Diversified Settlements

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African trading partners have been gradually moving away from rubles as the main settlement currency with Russia, a shift that became clear in mid-2023 as many states leaned toward what observers call “friendly currencies.” During July 2023, the proportion of payments settled in rubles fell, while currencies such as the yuan and the rupee gained momentum. A Canadian-based or regional broadcaster RBC highlighted a rebalancing of bilateral settlements and a readiness among African nations to pursue currency arrangements that bypass traditional Western-dominated channels.

Overall, the data indicate a clear tilt in Russo-African trade toward non-dollar instruments. By early 2024, friendly currencies accounted for 78.8 percent of settlements—the highest level seen since the start of the current observation cycle in January 2021. In contrast, the ruble’s share in trade settlements remained subdued, slipping to around 12.7 percent by late 2023 and into 2024. This reflects a longer-run reassessment of payment methods among a growing set of partner economies. The share of what observers term unfriendly currencies, namely the dollar and the euro, also declined to roughly 8.5 percent, signaling a broader move away from conventional hard-currency settlements in parts of the region.

Historically, the ruble held a prominent position in Africa as the preferred means of trade with Russia. In February 2023, its share was about 82.4 percent, underscoring a period when Moscow’s bilateral payments aligned closely with ruble-based settlement. The latest movements point to a strategic diversification: African governments and banks appear ready to adopt currency arrangements that offer greater autonomy from Western-dominated financial systems and, in some cases, more predictable exchange-rate exposure amid growing trade with Russia. This interpretation is echoed by Ruslan Davydov, the acting head of Russia’s Federal Customs Service, who framed the dynamics as filling a vacancy created by partners unwilling to cooperate with Moscow. Davydov suggested that the absence of unfamiliar partners is being supplanted by economies keen to deepen ties, including several African states, resulting in a modest but steady expansion in overall trade with Russia. The implication for observers is clear: when policy and market signals align toward broader currency diversification, bilateral commerce can expand even as payment methods evolve. Davydov’s view emphasizes that not just the currency mix but also trade volumes are shifting in tandem, a development that could influence how both sides price, finance, and settle future transactions. (RBC)

Trade data accompanying the shift show a measurable rise in Russia’s commerce with Africa, with export-heavy flows reaching new highs while imports from Africa also grew. Reported figures indicate that trade between Russia and Africa rose from 2.3 percent to 3.7 percent of Russia’s total trade, with exports totaling around 32.9 billion dollars and imports about 22.2 billion dollars within the observed period. Analysts, including Alexander Knobel, Director of the International Trade Research Center at the Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), note that currency shares in settlements are inherently volatile and prone to month-to-month variations. Knobel points out that when one currency strengthens, another can wane in a recurring cycle that mirrors broader shifts in risk tolerance, inflation expectations, and policy signals from both sides of the relationship. The takeaway for policymakers and business leaders is that the currency architecture of Russo-African trade remains fluid, with prices and hedging strategies adapting to evolving settlement patterns. (RBC)

Beyond the currency mix, the quarterly and annual revenue picture tells a broader story about Russia’s economic posture. Earlier discussions suggested that revenue from energy resource sales could be influenced by changes in trade finance and settlement practices, and there were conversations about how such shifts might shape the composition of export earnings. Separately, SIPRI had noted a reduction in defense export activity. While this is a different domain, it forms part of the broader context of Russia’s trade relationships and the diversification of its export portfolio. Taken together, these elements point to a more diversified but also more nuanced set of drivers shaping Russia’s external trade and its currency arrangements with partner regions, including Africa. (RBC)

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