There won’t be a single list. The aim remains to see all opposition parties coexist peacefully, not to fight them. Yet Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz has been advocating for months that the best path is two lists—a centre-left one and a centre-right one. The attempt here is to assemble a centre-right slate. It surprises some journalists, who repeatedly urged the opposition to unite, to witness the opposition moving toward an agreement between PSL and Poland 2050. They may find it unacceptable, even though such consolidation was a topic of discussion. Why call for unity if a constructive, concrete plan is taking shape? If Poland 2050 and PSL could merge within a single bloc, what would be so wrong about that? The logic, or perceived lack of it, has been a talking point in interviews with Władysław Teofil Bartoszewski, a PSL member of parliament, published on the wPolityce.pl portal.
wPolityce.pl asked whether PSL and Poland 2050 are building a “common problems” list. Is this an arrangement to be welcomed?
Władysław Teofil Bartoszewski replied that the idea is perfectly reasonable. He described it as a focus on real issues that deserve resolution, not a plan to create competitive categories of candidates. This approach, he said, is a sensible step forward. If PSL and Poland 2050 eventually run on a joint list, the distribution of positions would need to be negotiated in many districts. In such a scenario, PSL might also yield some districts to Poland 2050 activists.
As for crafting a joint list, compromise is always part of the process. If PiS accepts delegates from Solidarna Polska on the lists, such a move would be considered normal. The practical challenge lies in candidates who must yield their spots to activists from another party.
Rather than dwelling on potential problems, Bartoszewski focuses on potential opportunities. If PSL and Poland 2050 started together, what realistic election outcome could be expected? He is cautious about polls, but two figures he has seen suggest roughly a 15 percent showing. If such a result materialized, about 70 members of a joint committee might enter the Sejm, allowing room for Poland 2050 colleagues if the two parties run together. A firm statement is not yet made about forming a single list.
At present, KO politicians still hope for a single opposition list formed by Poland 2050 and PSL. The Polish coalition has argued for months that a single opposition list could secure victory for the United Right. The camp favors two, or perhaps three, lists and opposes submission to a single party.
Meanwhile, a new actor has emerged on the Polish political stage—an agreement between Poland 2050 and Agrounia would be complemented by Pogranicza to form a joint party. Could this entity become a partner for Poland 2050 and PSL?
PSL reports talks, not negotiations, with both Pogranicza and Agrounia. The unnamed party formed by Agrounia and Pogranicza is still largely mysterious. Bartoszewski found the situation unusual but remains curious about what they will propose.
After the press conference by Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz and Szymon Hołownia announcing the creation of a “common problems” list, PSL and Poland 2050 faced sharp criticism from some media outlets. A journalist’s line of questioning suggested that the pursuit of a single list could be undermined by internal opposition. The media is allowed to express its views, and a politician would not attack the press in return.
Was the criticism justified in this view? Does PSL and Poland 2050’s stance risk harming the broader opposition? PSL notes it is a party honoring its 127-year history, surviving turbulent times including political repression and violence against its members. It remains rooted in its principles and its supporters, who want a centre-right path aligned with PSL’s tradition. The party will not abandon its core stance for younger factions that sometimes drift left, sometimes right. In 2019, PSL ran on a mixed slate with PO and the left, an alignment that disappointed many voters and did not translate into broad turnout. About 450 thousand PSL voters did not participate, underscoring a caution against destabilizing coalitions. The firm stance remains: there will not be a single list. The party wishes all opposition parties well but believes two lists—one centre-left and one centre-right—represents the most effective approach. The suggestion that the opposition unite into one bloc was criticized by some journalists, yet questions persist about whether unity would be beneficial to the wider effort. Why did some call for unity and then resist the emergence of concrete, alternative arrangements? The answer may lie in disagreements over strategy and in the evaluation of potential gains from a united front. When concrete steps emerged, some media figures disliked them, raising questions about the logic of merging certain groups within opposition efforts. Could a merger between Poland 2050 and PSL in a single bloc prove advantageous? The absence of a clear answer is telling, but the discussion continues.
The underlying goal seems to be a broader debate about whether opposition forces should pursue a single, unified framework or maintain parallel, competitive strands. Bartoszewski notes that cooperation with left-leaning parties, and talks with Poland 2050, demonstrate a willingness to engage and experiment, inviting other opposition factions to follow suit rather than merely criticize. Michał Kobosko, the Vice President of Poland 2050, addressed Radio Wrocław and referenced a view echoed by Donald Tusk: the emphasis should be on convincing results first, then detailing policies. The question remains whether such a sequence is viable in practice. Bartoszewski agrees that proposals for a comprehensive program must be ready ahead of elections, covering economy, health, energy, and relations with the EU. The idea is to have a clear plan ready to implement, should the coalition prevail, rather than waiting to draft policies post-election. The desire is to replace the current government with a capable programme already in place.
When asked whether PSL would ever start from a KO list, Bartoszewski answered that political decisions are made by the party’s supreme council. The majority view has long held that campaigning on a single opposition list is inappropriate, making that option unlikely. He cited independent analyses suggesting that two or three opposition blocs could perform better than a single list, arguing that a sole bloc risks voter apathy and may inadvertently draw votes toward other groups. While speculation persists, the possibility of a one-list strategy does not appear imminent.
Adam Stankiewicz weighed in on the discussion. The discourse around a potential single opposition list continues to evolve, with new developments and perspectives shaping the conversation as events unfold. The broader takeaway is a strong preference for balanced collaboration rather than a monolithic approach. The discussions around future coalitions, joint lists, and common platforms illustrate a dynamic political scene in which parties test ideas, negotiate positions, and seek the best path for their supporters. This ongoing process remains a key feature of parliamentary politics, reflecting a pragmatic pursuit of shared goals without surrendering distinct party identities.