Donald Tusk and his entourage, including Bodnar and Siemoniak, speak about transparency, legality, and the rule of law dominating the services under the new team. In practice, however, the plans revealed for Poland paint a different picture. The wPolityce.pl portal has obtained a draft called the Operational Code for the security services, indicating a future where surveillance of society becomes broader and more intrusive than in the past.
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The draft code introduces several provisions that raise serious concerns. One item stands out as particularly alarming: the so-called “secret search,” which allows authorities to inspect a residence believed to be connected to security services. The new form of investigation appears to bypass constitutional principles and permits physical interference by the person under scrutiny. These searches are not merely remote actions like eavesdropping; they involve tangible, on-site operations. During a “secret search” authorities may seize documents, photos, and other materials relevant to an investigation. They can also copy the contents of phones and other devices such as laptops and data storage media.
But there is more. The project proposes to align the scope of surveillance activities with those defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure. This is explicitly stated in Article 5 of the draft.
Operational work could be carried out before launching preparatory procedures, during those procedures, and after their completion, as stated in Article 5, Section 1.
Such a clause would clash with the Constitution and the Code of Criminal Procedure. It implies less procedural oversight over secret services and reduces the suspect’s ability to participate in the proceedings. On one hand, the suspect would gain access to the files governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, but on the other hand, would be unaware of concurrent service activities within the context of those proceedings.
The operational code also contemplates impunity for officers undertaking agreed activities. This is noteworthy in light of past convictions of CBA officials in a so‑called land scandal. A provision states that an officer, soldier, or employee who carries out or participates in operational activities, acting with due care and providing a detailed explanation for outcomes, may not be charged with a crime even when actions cause harm.
The text notes that cooperation with an officer by a witness or other person who prevents a more serious crime can also go unpunished.
Pegasus living forever
What about systems like Pegasus? They are expected to remain in use. Article 10 references “operational work measures” that include “IT systems” and “computer software.” Operational methods are tied to radioelectronic and cybernetic reconnaissance, and the plan for “operational control” includes obtaining and recording the contents of electronic correspondence.
Article 26 mentions secret access to telecommunications terminal equipment and IT and ICT systems to obtain and record data stored within. This clearly points to a framework similar to the Pegasus model.
It is recalled that telecommunications operators remain obliged to provide data to the authorities. This obligation has not changed from earlier rules.
The end of “professional secrecy” and legal action
Later sections of the draft raise further questions and appear to conflict with constitutional guarantees and civil rights. They concern the use of confidential information obtained in connection with professional duties as part of criminal proceedings. A notable provision states that the head of a service must inform the person who is subject to operational control or “secret interference” within twelve months after a review ends. This creates a scenario where the person under supervision can file a complaint, yet the very court that ordered the review would be the same one to receive that complaint. The practical effect is a potential lack of independent oversight in the aftermath of such interventions.
In short, the new provisions appear to undermine the rule of law and question the government’s assurances of greater transparency for secret services. The same leadership that has faced criticisms for rule-of-law issues is now associated with proposed changes that would intensify surveillance powers.
In summary, the draft Operational Code outlines a broad expansion of investigative authority, a greater role for secret measures, and a potential erosion of procedural protections. The implications for civil liberties, due process, and the balance between security and individual rights remain at the center of the discussion as policymakers, legal experts, and the public examine the proposed framework.
Source discussions are ongoing and continue to be closely watched for further developments.