Earlier this month, a controversy erupted after journalists from TV Republika published a letter from Poland’s General Staff in response to a Ministry of Finance proposal aimed at deep cuts to arms procurement spending. The proposal envisioned reducing Central Materiel Plans by more than PLN 57 billion for 2025–2028, a 25% reduction over the four-year stretch. The cuts would translate to nearly PLN 5 billion fewer in 2025, over PLN 6.5 billion less in 2026, PLN 18 billion less in 2027, and more than PLN 28 billion trimmed in 2028. The Chief of the General Staff, General Wiesław Kukuła, rejected these reductions, arguing that they would severely disrupt the Armed Forces’ modernization trajectory. The General Staff warned that implementing operational programs and the package for strengthening the forces would become infeasible, that the “Szpej” project could not be carried out, that the long-term National Ammunition Reserve program would be jeopardized, and that securing allied presence on Poland’s soil would face serious complications. They also suggested that the recently announced Prime Minister’s Shield East initiative could no longer be pursued as planned.
Following a media storm triggered by the revelation of attempts to cut military spending, President Andrzej Duda, who serves as Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Armed Forces, stated that he had discussed the issue with the Minister of Defense and the Deputy Minister of Defense, as well as Prime Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz. The minister of defense conveyed to the president that he would not approve such cuts. He reportedly told the president that if these reductions occurred, he would have to step down. The president added that the minister had said he would not remain in his post under those circumstances, explicitly stating that defense spending could not be reduced.
Despite the immediate controversy, the immediate crisis over 2025–2028 modernization spending appeared to ease for a time after the defense minister’s clarification. Yet, commentary circulating on social media continues to raise questions about the Ministry of Finance signing procurement contracts for military equipment. This situation suggests that this year’s defense budget may not be fully utilized, including funds allocated to the extrabudgetary Armed Forces Support Fund. The annual defense spending figure was planned near PLN 118 billion, with the Armed Forces Support Fund accounting for about PLN 51 billion, and an anticipated PLN 10 billion contribution from the Ministry of Defense’s budget. In total, roughly PLN 159 billion was slated for national defense that year, equating to around 4.1% of GDP. Early-year assessments, however, indicate that actual outlays are at serious risk of underspending.
Moreover, despite framework agreements announced by Minister Mariusz Błaszczak in mid-2022 for the purchase of cutting-edge equipment, no binding contracts had been signed for several key programs. These include the Korean-made 212 K9 gun-howitzers, 640 K2 tanks destined for production in Poland, 152 Krab gun howitzers with factories in Stalowa Wola, as well as 486 American Himars launchers and 96 Apache helicopters. An analysis by the Supreme Audit Office questioned the timely release of advances for arma contracts in 2023, signaling potential delivery delays and production bottlenecks in Polish defense facilities. The current leadership of the Ministry of Defense and coalition members in the Defense Committee have expressed agreement with this assessment, indicating that certain financial instruments may no longer be used to accelerate procurement within the year. This raises concerns that, despite the stated aim of 4.1% of GDP for defense spending, the planned budget might not be fully realized, even though many contracts with domestic and international defense suppliers have been awaiting signature for over a year.
Historically, similar measures were observed during the previous government years of 2008–2014, when careful maneuvers allowed a notable reduction in defense expenditure while maintaining a modest overall budget. If the present coalition structure persists, budgetary cutbacks in national defense from 2025 onward seem likely, particularly in light of the European Commission’s decision to initiate the excessive deficit procedure against Poland. The evolving political and fiscal landscape thus continues to shape the trajectory of Poland’s defense modernization and industrial programs, with ongoing debates about how to balance strategic resilience against public finances and long-term security commitments.