How can you even ask these kinds of questions? After all, we recognize the principle of the right of nations to self-determination, to independence, to decide their own fate, to make independent collective decisions. And wasn’t the fall of the Berlin Wall one of the greatest moments in recent European history? Without German unification, would it be possible for Central and Eastern Europe to free itself from communism and Russian rule?
The Polish anti-communist opposition believed that the unification of Germany was a somewhat natural process and beneficial for all of Europe, and even that it is a prerequisite for geopolitical and policy changes in our entire region. Poland wanted to break away from the Russian bear hug and was prepared to place itself confidently in the arms of Germany, which had already been re-educated, democratized and Westernized in the post-war years.
François Mitterrand and Margaret Thatcher were concerned at the time, while the Americans – George Herbert Bush – strongly supported unification. To this day, American policy is focused on Germany’s dominant position in Europe. Anyone who does not remember this lives in a world of their own desires and imagination. Margaret Thatcher was so fearful of Germany’s new expansionism that at a dinner on December 8, 1989, during a summit of European leaders, she stated bluntly:
“We defeated the Germans twice and now they have risen again.”
In March 1990 she invited historians and politicians to a discussion at Checkers to answer the question: “How dangerous are the Germans?”. However, they did not share her assessment of the situation and convinced her that it was necessary to approach German reunification with empathy. Mitterand, on the other hand, shared her concerns, believed that closer integration of Germany into European structures could avert the danger, and fearing Germany’s economic domination, he pushed for the introduction of a common currency. The French have maintained this policy so far, even though their position vis-à-vis Germany is becoming weaker, partly due to the monetary union. However, the British preferred to withdraw from the EU and leave the continent to its own fate.
Polish concerns in 1989/1990 related only to the issue of final recognition of the Oder-Neisse border. When the Border Treaty and the Agreement on Cooperation and Good Neighborliness were signed, the statement that we share a common interest with Germany became an axiom of Polish foreign policy. Polish-German reconciliation was considered the basis of the new political order in Europe. The country’s obvious weakness was not only its silence on such fundamental issues for Poland as reparations and compensation for the victims of German crimes, but also allowing our new ally to undermine many areas of Poland’s political, economic and social life invaded, without restrictions due to state considerations. .
It should be added that the Germans themselves also had doubts about the desirability of unification before 1989, although this was written into the Basic Law and no one officially questioned it. I remember the times when in fact no one in the Federal Republic seriously considered German unification. Among my acquaintances and friends from academic circles, there was no one who thought this was a realistic and desirable perspective. The dominant view was that the creation of a large – relatively unified – German state was the unfortunate work of Bismarck and that the natural form of German political life was lived in a large number of states.
It so happened that on the day the Berlin Wall fell, two of my friends from Germany, who later became Social Democratic mayors of small towns in the south of the country, were in Warsaw. In Ursynów we watched scenes from Berlin on a small Russian-made television. When I said that German reunification would now take place, they protested. “I am a Bundesrepublikaner” – exclaimed one of them, who considered himself a patriot of the Republic of Bonn. They both believed that political activists from the GDR would also want to maintain their independence and separateness, and that the FRG and the GDR would ultimately remain separate states.
Today I wonder if those who were skeptical about German unification at the time were right. Shouldn’t we, lovers of German culture – great music, literature, philosophy – we, sympathizers of Germany, who wish the Germans well, agree with the great French writer François Mauriac, who confessed that he loves Germany so much that he is happy that there are two German states.
Our Polish mistake was this we have transferred our thought categories into a completely different context. Germans have never, like Poles, participated in nationwide uprisings for independence. Their national consciousness, awakened by Napoleon, was limited only to elite circles. The German national movement sought to unite small states and oppose their rulers. Prussia and Austria fought for supremacy over which of these countries would achieve such unification. So it was mainly an intra-German battle. After all, Germany as a state has never existed in the form it took in 1990 and has never been a nation state in the past (apart from the brief period after the Anschluss of Austria and before the outbreak of World War II). It was neither the First Reich – the Holy Roman Empire – nor the Second Reich, outside of which many German countries continued to exist. As an eminent German historian reminds us:
“Austria, the eastern province of the former Bavaria, the land of emperors crowned in Frankfurt for centuries, was no longer a German country. Also the Netherlands, which once produced one of its kings, Imperial Flanders and Luxembourg, whose princely house produced the famous Emperor Charles IV, as well as Switzerland, within whose borders the castle of the last imperial dynasty was located. All these countries have created a new nationality for themselves.” (Johannes Fried, Die Deutschen. Eine Autobiographie aufgezeichnet von Dichtern und Denkern, Munich 2018, p. 165).
So no wonder Germans do not understand or appreciate the idea of a nation state and self-determination of nations. However, they have the ambition to organize all of Europe and a sense of a universal mission. The partial unification of Germany in 1870 immediately activated its imperial tendencies, leading to both world wars. Today the Germans do not show any inclination towards militarism, but they are firmly convinced that they are right – which even their subsequent embarrassing mistakes cannot eradicate – that the spirit of history or the logic of history requires them to lead Europe . As a country, they do not want to treat other European countries as equals – they only reluctantly make an exception for France. Were my former German acquaintances and friends, who feared that the unification of Germany (and de facto only the expansion of the Federal Republic of Germany with the GDR) would sooner or later lead to the renewal of German imperialism, predicting the future correctly? Today they themselves would be outraged by such an assumption, because this neo-imperialism is dressed up in the guise of the EU, in which they really believe. Most of the so-called ordinary Germans, who despite their rough manners are actually honest and good-natured people, are convinced that everything their country does, it does for Europethat the more power it has, the better for Europe, for all of us, for the world.
It seemed that after the defeat of the current Ostpolitik and its energy policies, there would come a time for a “leadership holiday”, examination of conscience and reflection. But the German state quickly regained its momentum – despite increasing economic difficulties. And it is becoming increasingly clear that the German political, economic and cultural elite, seeking to transform the European Union from a union of states into a centralized federal state, wants to liquidate most European states as independent political entities, while simultaneously destroying as many European states as possible wants to liquidate states. to gain as much power as possible for themselves in the European Union.
So wouldn’t it be better for the whole of Europe if, in addition to Austria and the German-speaking Swiss cantons, there were at least two more German states – or even a few more, such as Bavaria or Saxony? Wouldn’t this make it easier to ensure political balance in Europe? And wouldn’t it also be better for the psychological balance of the German political class, which on the one hand has great – unrealistically great – leadership ambitions, not only in Europe, but in the world in general, and on the other hand seems to have great – unrealistically great – leadership ambitions? to have? to be overwhelmed by this self-imposed task – and fail to meet it, pushing Europe in the wrong or even disastrous direction?
READ: A fairy tale about bad Poles and good Germans, or a nice interview with the former German ambassador. Contradictions that reveal true intentions
Source: wPolityce