The 2008 war with Georgia was Russia’s first intervention outside its borders, the beginning of a series of actions we all know today – the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas in 2014, followed by a large-scale aggression against Ukraine – says Wojciech Górecki of the Center for Oriental Studies.
Georgia was just the beginning of the implementation of “Russian interests”
The war with Georgia in August 2008 was Russia’s first military intervention outside its borders since the collapse of the USSR, in defense of, as rightly so, “Russian interests”.
– says Wojciech Górecki, who is responsible for the South Caucasus at the Center for Oriental Studies.
In 2014, Russia annexed Crimea and started a war in the Donbass, and eight years later launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. From a historical perspective, we see that August 2008 was the beginning of a whole series of events that led us to a full-scale war in Ukraine
Gorecki adds.
Eastern Europe warned
Governments and experts in Eastern Europe have repeatedly pointed out after the outbreak of a wide-ranging war in Ukraine that the lack of a decisive response to the war with Georgia and the then “rotten compromise” provided an incentive for Russia to act aggressively.
Until February 24, 2022, there was a strong belief in the major cabinets of Western countries (and in some later as well) that an agreement with Russia could be sought through negotiations, “clearance of discrepancies” and efforts to satisfy further claims. Prior to the invasion of Ukraine, Moscow demanded “guarantees” – not only not to expand NATO eastward, but also to withdraw the Alliance’s infrastructure back to its pre-1997 borders.
In this regard, everyone remembers President Lech Kaczyński’s speech on Rustaveli Avenue in Tbilisi, and it was indeed prophetic. Because he foreshadowed what happened next
Wojciech Górecki tells PAP.
We know very well that today Georgia, tomorrow Ukraine, the day after tomorrow the Baltic States and later maybe it’s time for my country, Poland!
– said the Polish President, Professor Lech Kaczyński, who, together with the Presidents of Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Ukraine, went to Tbilisi on August 12, 2008 to show solidarity and support to Georgia in seeking a settlement.
On the same day, France, holding the presidency of the EU, led to the signing of the agreement, named after the names of the signatories – the presidents of Russia and France – the Medvedev-Sarkozy agreement. According to the account of the then president of Georgia, Sarkozy insisted on accepting the Russian terms because “neither he nor George Bush would send troops”.
“You can’t compromise on hard security”
From today’s perspective, the conclusion is that you can’t compromise on hard security
says Gorecki. He adds that a recent BBC publication on the activities of Russian diplomacy on the eve of the war in Ukraine contained reports that “the Americans were prepared to make very far-reaching concessions to avoid escalation”.
There should be no room for such actions, because sooner or later they will lead to escalation
says Gorecki.
Russia on Georgia was emboldened by NATO’s lack of details
The Russo-Georgian war took place after the April 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, where it was assured that Georgia and Ukraine would be admitted to NATO, but with no specific dates or roadmap.
The second point is the recognition by the majority of the collective West of Kosovo’s independence, which Russia opposed
says Gorecki.
Georgia fired first, but it happened after a series of Russian provocations from South Ossetian territory. Later, in Mikheil Saakashvili’s memoirs, he wrote that if Georgia had not done what it did, Russia would have attacked anyway. Of course no one will check
says Gorecki.
Conflict report
The OSW analyst worked as an expert in the international fact-finding mission into the causes of the conflict, led by Swiss diplomat Heidi Tagliavini (Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, IIFFMCG).
The report concluded that both sides were indeed responsible for the outbreak of war. However, it should be added that the Georgian actions were preceded by numerous Russian provocations and that Georgia behaved as Russia expected. The report further stated that Russia was much more responsible for the pre-war escalation than Georgia
says Gorecki.
Among other things, it was about the distribution of Russian passports to Abkhazians and South Ossetians, about the issue of the introduction of Russian troops, especially in Abkhazia.
Another thing is that Russia reacted disproportionately. Georgia attacked targets in South Ossetia, and if Russia had responded in Ossetia, it would probably still fall under the concept of just response, while Russia not only occupied Ossetia, but also entered Abkhazia, as well as so-called Georgia, really. And from some places she withdrew only more than two years later
Gorecki remembers.
The problem of Georgia’s separatist regions
The war ended after five days, but under unfavorable conditions for Tbilisi, among others, the agreement negotiated with Sarkozy’s support said the status of the breakaway regions would be settled later.
It is incorrect to say that Georgia lost control of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after the 2008 war because there have been two separatist regions backed by Russia in most of these areas since the early 1990s. However, until 2008, attempts at a peaceful settlement were made under the supervision of international organizations – the UN in Abkhazia and the OSCE in South Ossetia. At the time, Russia, like the entire international community, recognized these areas as part of Georgia
Gorecki points out.
He adds that long before the Augustan War and the Ukraine War, Russia “used elements of hybrid activities in the separatist areas similar to those it later practiced in the Donbass”.
On August 26, 2008, Russia recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia within the borders of former administrative units within the USSR, i.e. with areas controlled by Tbilisi before August 2008.
15 years after the war
Fifteen years after the war, which he said was “a huge trauma for Georgians”, Tbilisi is accused of pursuing a pro-Russian policy.
This should be subdivided into the sphere of declarations and actual actions. Nothing has changed in terms of statements – Tbilisi demands the restoration of territorial integrity, declares its desire to join the EU, and the Abkhazia and South Ossetia issues are a “red line”. In terms of activities, however, there is already evidence of a pro-Russian turn. This includes not participating in the sanctions, which increases sales and trade relations with Russia. In May this year air links with Russia were resumed, which for many became a symbol of this pro-Russian turn
says Gorecki.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and his longtime spokeswoman Maria Zakharova have more than once praised Tbilisi for its “reason” and accused the West of trying to “draw Georgia into the war”.
“Georgia has no chance to defend itself like Ukraine
As Górecki adds, one can argue about the role of Saakashvili, currently imprisoned (for “abuse of power”), the main foe of the ruling Georgian Dream Party and her grise eminence, accused of vague ties to Russia by businessman Bidzina Ivanishvili.
There are voices that the government operates on the principle of “the friend of my enemy is my enemy” and therefore expresses no greater willingness to support Ukraine. On the other hand, you also need to understand the “geographical” context. Georgia is a small country bordering Russia, which he is very afraid of. In the event of an attack, there is no chance to defend yourself like Ukraine
Gorecki concludes.
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rm/PAP
Source: wPolityce