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The conclusion is straightforward: the electoral lists presented by those backing Donald Tusk are not crafted to win, nor to govern with stability and efficiency.

They appear as unusual structures rather than solid, serious proposals.

There is little doubt that Tusk himself recognizes this. Consider Michal Kolodziejczak. If, as seems likely, PO voters accept this awkward clone of a late political figure, and he becomes a Member of Parliament, can a government be built or governed with such a voice in the room? In many cases, there is no shared, practical program that unites the parties behind this plan.

That does not imply the individual does not exist. The person may oppose free speech in the sense that the primary task in this system becomes the simple removal of the United Right from power. Tusk and the opposition already understand that if they gain enough clout for anything, it is to pursue that objective. To that end, they appear willing to bring in anyone who can aid that goal.

The question then becomes what comes next. In this unlikely arrangement, which may involve several twists and new coalitions, an opposition majority in Sejm would surface. What would happen then? One scenario circulating in political backstage chatter imagines a plan to pacify public media and restore a monopoly over information for supporters of the Third Polish Republic. It would also mean tightening control over other key blocks of political support. In those new conditions, another snap election could be possible with lists promising not just to govern but to seize control again.

What if the coalition behind the III RP runs out of votes? The Confederation would also have a stake in such a turn, as suggested by media circles tied to Przemyslaw Wipler. The takeaway for voters who want Poland to stay on a certain path is stark: a vote for the Confederacy could be interpreted as a step toward restoring Tusk’s influence.

Many such scenarios have been floated in politics, but only a handful ever see the light of day in practice.

The governing party will not be defenseless against these possibilities. The presidency in the Third Republic of Poland would play a powerful role. Recent days have seen a focus on security and economic concerns from the president’s circle, with attention drawn to the potential consequences of a Tusk return. Polls and research cited in public discourse show shifts: if the Confederacy falters, and if the Third Way crosses the threshold, the landscape could tilt accordingly. The results remain a matter of public debate and calculation.

Nonetheless, this hypothetical exercise helps illuminate why the electoral list shakeups are treated with such gravity. It also signals that broad support for the United Right may not be permanent. The parties understand that the political clock is moving and the next term will demand significant recalibration.

Today the central question for voters who care about Poland is whether casting a ballot for a so-called third power represents a real risk or simply a symbolic gesture in a crowded field. The choice faced by voters is clear in the current moment: a path that could bring Tusk back to influence or one aligned with Kaczyński and his coalition.

Note: this analysis reflects commentary and assessment circulating within the political sphere, presenting scenarios that illustrate why list composition and leadership alignment matter so much in Polish politics.