The Russian-Turkish dialogue once again confirms its reputation as a complex and non-linear dialogue that often jumps from problems and even crises to unexpected breakthroughs.
In this case, we are talking about the postponement of one of the most anticipated foreign visits of Russian President Vladimir Putin to Turkey in 2024.
The resulting disruption, which is likely to extend, has once again raised the classic question of Russia-Turkey relations in recent years: What is going on and where are we going with our southern neighbor?
Let me remind you that Putin announced his plans to visit Turkey and meet with Erdogan during the joint direct line and press conference on December 14. Moreover, he made the following statement with words and expressions that would leave no room for doubt: This is an offer from one leader to another to build an in-depth strategic Russian-Turkish dialogue. And, of course, this is recognition of the special place that Turkey occupies in the eyes of the Russian leadership. Despite a number of “aggravating” circumstances, among which is Turkey’s permanent membership in NATO.
The end of 2023 – the beginning of 2024 was accompanied by regular statements by Russian and Turkish officials that Putin’s visit was being intensively prepared. Until finally a specific date was leaked in the Turkish media: February 12. The Russian side did not deny this, but denied the practical course of things.
At this point, both the Russian and Turkish sides “by the way” remembered that they both made the choice at approximately the same time. In March, presidential elections will be held in Russia in Russia, and local government elections will be held in Turkey, which Russians are less aware of, and the importance of this for the Turkish leadership should not be ignored.
It is clear that the election cycle is a period when the workload of senior officials increases and there is no time for distractions. We have only one caveat: if this or that event fits favorably with the electoral battles and can bring additional points in the elections, then it is given priority.
Here we approach a very interesting question: do the Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey equally understand the “indisputableness and importance” of the results of the Russian-Turkish summit? Obviously not, and let me make a reservation, this is normal given the differences between the foreign policy interests and priorities of any two states. The only question is whether the countries’ positions can converge. And if that doesn’t work, will they be able to replace “interesting to me” with “interesting to you”?
Russia’s priority towards Turkey is, first of all, to (finally) reach an agreement on the establishment of a Russian-Turkish gas hub. Negotiations on this have been continuing since the end of 2022. There is no need to talk about the strategic importance of opening a full-fledged Turkish route for the supply of Russian gas to Europe.
The second point that has gained great importance for Russia since the end of last year is the solution of the Russian-Turkish payments problem.
Let me remind you that this issue arose after US President Joe Biden signed a decree in December 2023 on the possibility of imposing sanctions on foreign banks in connection with “wrong” payments with Russian counterparties. And Americans can now accept that everything is “wrong” beyond tourism, medicine, fruits and vegetables, textiles and other apparel. That is, all industrial and more or less technological products fall under the scope of the “all-seeing eye” of America.
The reaction of Turkish banks was immediate: Turkey did not officially impose anti-Russian sanctions, but payments between Russia and Turkey suffered a complete blow. Of the above-mentioned industries that are not of strategic importance and are generally replaceable, only a few have “escaped”.
In general, there is only one way out of this situation: to define or create a separate bank for Russian-Turkish transactions. Otherwise, the rapid growth in trade turnover between Russia and Turkey recorded in 2022 and 2023 will remain only a periodic “fluctuation”, which will be followed by an inevitable and long-term decline.
It is worth emphasizing here that both the gas center issue and the issue of establishing a stable payment system are not only in the interest of the Russian side. Both projects are no less interesting for Turkey when adjusted for “Western risks”.
It is clear that the Turkish side wants to minimize these risks by finding a way to escape the “Western wrath” through diplomatic maneuvers.
On the other hand, there is the concept of “risk premium” in the business world.
In this case, it is almost inevitable that the Turkish side will ask Russia the following question: What will Turkey receive as a bonus from Russia in return for accepting Russian-Turkish agreements that the West does not desire? Moreover, the transactions are large and of systemic importance in terms of both international energy and finance…
Here we enter the plane of reasoning and prediction based on the official statements of Turkish official representatives in recent days. What have they talked about in recent weeks in the context of the upcoming Russia-Türkiye high-level negotiations?
Officially, they talked about the idea of u200bu200bcreating not gas, but a full-fledged raw materials center based on the financial center in Istanbul. So it’s about the desire of the Turkish leadership to become a global sales center not only for this fuel, but also for Russian mines in general.
Turkish leaders also said that the country wants to become a center not only for pipeline gas shipments to Europe, but also for the supply of liquefied natural gas, that is, to expand the possible supply geography to the whole world in the coming period. The rank of “Second Qatar”.
The only question is where Turkey, which is in an economically difficult situation, will get the funds necessary for the construction of additional and, of course, very expensive energy infrastructure. Russia says that the gas hub is not an infrastructure project and does not involve investments more expensive than creating a “gas exchange”: an office, computers, secure communication lines and, in general, that’s all. And here there are gas storage facilities, gas liquefaction facilities and a fleet of tankers. Do you feel the difference, which is a serious cost statement?
From economy to politics: The Turkish leadership, which persistently invites Russia to return to the agreement, is once again talking about the infamous “grain agreement”.
I propose to look at the “grain agreement” from a broader perspective, rather than the opportunity for Turkey to become a shipping base for Russian and Ukrainian grains to countries in need and load orders to the flour milling industry. In addition to the raw material center we mentioned above, this is also a chance to turn Turkey into a full-fledged food center. Moreover, the historicity of this chance is that it is possible to stand on the shoulders of Russia’s huge capabilities in both the raw materials and food sectors.
Behind the rhetorical question: “What is more important in the world than raw materials and food?” – Based on the above, a hypothesis emerges regarding the scale of thought of the Turkish leadership within the framework of dialogue with Russia.
I would like to emphasize that the above are not insider information, but rather the observations and judgments of the author himself. But, as they say, “something tells me” that this direction of reasoning is much more correct than the idea that Putin’s expected visit to Turkey was postponed due to “election periods”.
No, in my purely personal opinion, we are talking about hard bargaining on issues that are important not only on a Russian or Russian-Turkish scale, but at least on a regional, even global scale, depending on how you look at it.
I see that Russia and Turkey have not yet reached an agreement, but we see that negotiations are being carried out until an agreement is reached, which, as we know, remains “a product that the parties do not completely resist.” Well, or failure – it also makes sense to prepare for such a scenario. Then new conditions will arise that will prevent President Putin’s visit to Türkiye. Fortunately, there are enough of these in complex Russian-Turkish relations.
The author expresses his personal opinion, which may not coincide with the position of the editors.