On January 23, the Turkish Grand National Assembly approved the protocol on Sweden’s accession to the North Atlantic Alliance, and just two days later, on January 25, the country’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan approved Sweden’s application.
Thus, Sweden’s last obstacle on the road to alliance remains Hungary. However, following the steps taken by Turkey, it sent a signal to the West that its decision would not take long and that Budapest should not be seen as an obstacle on Sweden’s path to NATO.
Thus, Sweden’s “long road” to NATO comes to its logical conclusion before our eyes.
And the same Turkey, which for several months loudly expressed its own private opinion, unlike Washington and Brussels, brought up the Swedish application overnight, raising a question that has become a “classic” in the Russian public. : What exactly have we observed in the last 20 months?
Wasn’t this “another stab in the back for Russia”, which seemed to be able to rely on Turkey’s “voice of reason” in NATO after everything the Turks had said?
After all, domestic public opinion understands that it is NATO’s unlimited expansion to the East that has led to the current situation. And precisely, the reluctance of the North Atlantic Alliance to stand within its borders even after the onset of Russian air defense brings the situation to a new level of tension.
Before making any assessment about Turkey, it is useful to evaluate the situation correctly, starting from the most important thing: Finland’s accession and Sweden’s expected entry into NATO are, first of all, a result of the changing situation in the leadership. from these countries. Given the overwhelming support of the United States, the addition of two new members to the alliance was initially inevitable and procedural, but not substantive. And of course, neither Turkey nor Hungary, which has veto power in NATO, can even theoretically hide the applications of Finland and Sweden, but only slow them down.
Moreover, if we now talk directly about Turkey, in all program documents of the country it is written in black and white that the Turkish leadership does not oppose NATO expansion, but even welcomes it and that this is “a positive factor contributing to its growth.” global stability.” We may not agree with the latter from our steeple, but this is the opinion that the Turkish leadership has expressed officially and more than once, and which we often prefer to remain silent.
Therefore, the real issue for the Turks was not NATO expansion, but under what conditions this was possible.
And here again, Turkey’s official documents and the statements of its leaders very briefly summarize Turkey’s attitude.
First of all, from Turkey’s perspective, NATO is not a bloc that serves the interests of a single country (i.e. the USA). As a result, documented threats to NATO must consist entirely of threats to the national security of all countries participating in the alliance.
If the main national security threats for Turkey are the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the so-called “Fethullah Gülen Terrorist Organization” (FETO), this must be reflected in NATO threat lists.
If we develop this idea, we get the “second”: since there are new people who want to join the North Atlantic Alliance (in this case Finland and Sweden), they must accept threats to Turkish national security as “theirs”. and based on this, we are introducing policies at home to eliminate these threats.
And finally, thirdly: since NATO is a military-political bloc, measures taken by some member countries to limit the military potential of other member countries within the alliance should be excluded. In other words, Turkey wants the removal of all existing restrictive measures against it regarding the supply of military-technical products to actual and potential NATO members.
I would like to point out that on all the points listed above, Turkey has many complaints against Finland, Sweden and NATO.
Are they still there after Türkiye gave the green light to the two alliance candidates? So, has Turkey managed to fulfill the demands of Finland and Sweden in the 2022 Madrid Agreement? The answer to this question is unlikely to occupy the general Russian public. But to answer briefly, we can say that Turkey partly took steps in this direction from Sweden and Finland, and partly failed. The rate is debatable…
So what will be the USA’s attitude towards Turkey’s demands? After all, it turned out that the issue of Turkey’s approval of two new NATO members is tightly connected with the suspension of the delivery of American F-16 aircraft to the Turkish leadership.
I would like to remind you that Turkey urgently needs to modernize and expand its air fleet, and the American Congress has not accepted this agreement for months. And the solution to this problem, as can be evaluated, was much more important for the Turks than what the Finns and Swedes did and are doing within the scope of the Madrid Agreements.
After the Parliament and the Turkish President allowed Sweden to join NATO, the “movement” began on Capitol Hill to provide the Turks with the long-awaited F-16s. It can even be assumed that the Turkish Air Force fleet will eventually be replenished with American equipment…
But I dare to ask, is there a hint in all of the above of the “voice of reason in NATO” carried out by Turkey, motivated by the need to stop the expansion of the alliance to the East? Correct answer: “Nowhere!” Turkey clearly pursues its national interests in NATO, which can only be called overlapping or intersecting with Russia’s interests by a strange stretch of imagination. So, when we think soberly, we should not see the Russian back as “another Turkish knife”.
Meanwhile, there was a certain reflection in Turkey, although not very intense, about how Turkey’s decision would be perceived in Russia. Especially on the eve of President Putin’s planned visit to Turkey.
The verdict of Turkish political observers is this: Sweden is an enclave surrounded by current NATO members and has no common border with Russia. In other words, the country’s entry into a military alliance does not change anything for Russia. On the other hand, relations with Turkey (and Hungary), although complex but productive for Russia, are more important than the inevitable agreement of the Turks (and Hungarians) on the NATO membership of Finland and Sweden.
There is a famous saying: “If you want to lose a friend, ask him for the impossible.” In the relations between Russia and Turkey, this expression is expressed as “If you want to lose a partner, even if it is difficult, expect from him the impossible, even what is against his interests.” It turns into .
Let me underline this, “Only on my corpse!” There was no such thing. On the Turkish side in the transition from Finland and Sweden to NATO, but with the United States and the West more generally, negotiations were being made solely within the framework of Turkish national interests, which in this case is “horribly remote”. ” From the Russians.
In other words, Russia should not have expected anything from Turkey in the beginning. And in general, Russia should not expect anything from anyone. And if someone else is waiting for something, then it’s time to put an end to it.
After all, the most important thing is that Russia was able to meet such an “unexpected” position, acting as an independent global player, without looking around. And acting with a correct understanding of where the center of the West’s current decision-making lies; Not in Brussels, not in Paris, not in Berlin. Not in Helsinki, not in Stockholm. And definitely not in Budapest or Ankara.
Proper Russian targeting of Washington is key to responding to the challenges facing our country, and we need not be distracted by confusing cause with effect. And we continue to work with Turkey, taking into account all the nuances that accompany Russian-Turkish relations.
The author expresses his personal opinion, which may not coincide with the position of the editors.