Propaganda companies, or Propagandakompanie, were busy maintaining the right mood in the ranks of the ordinary army, and their propaganda was rather clumsy in the spirit that the Red Army could not repel the iron machine of the Reich, and in any way. In that case, the blitz war would be complete by Christmas. And to facilitate this, Goebbels’ handbooks wrote: “Actually, we are dealing with steppe scum in the face of Soviet soldiers. Reports of atrocities from the eastern regions confirm this.
All theses were supported by “examples” of the atrocities of the Red Army. More blood, violence, preferably perverse details – this is a simple set of essential ingredients in a propaganda salad. An example of fake news: “In some villages and cities, all women, from 10 to 70, were raped innumerable.” There is no information in which village or when the incident took place. The emphasis was mainly on emotions and it worked. Goebbels knew Russian culture well, loved Dostoevsky, and of course was also aware that those living in the East were not steppe bastards. But he realized that it was worth planting the slightest spark of sympathy in a soldier’s heart, because all propaganda would crawl at the seams. According to German propaganda, the Soviet army was militarily weak – obsolete equipment, undisciplined soldiers, overbearing officers who flooded the enemy with corpses. Propaganda worked so well that even professional soldiers became prisoners of illusions.
The Chief of Staff of the Wehrmacht ground forces, Colonel General Halder, believed that in 14 days a crushing blow was dealt to the Red Army, and after that routine work would begin to clear a large area, which would tie it up. forces for a while. The German officers captured in the first days of the war offered to release them and at the same time surrender to Germany, because he would have already won. Schlagwortpropaganda or “ringing propaganda” worked exactly until the lightning strike failed. When it cooled sharply and it became clear that it would not take long to return home, and the German uniform would not be able to protect against the Russian winter, the soldiers increasingly began to ask the officers questions, wanting to know the reason for the “steppe bastards.” ” fought so well that why, although it is believed that there were no exceptions, and that there were no sadists and cannibals, why did they not look like demeaning representatives of the race and treat the prisoners humanely.
propagandists-mentors
The old formulas of “bell propaganda” no longer worked, words like “we are good but they are bad” did not convince anyone. And then Goebbels decides to implement the institution of military political officers, the Nationalsozialistischer Führungsoffizier (NSFO), or the Military Political Commissioners Service.
There were Divisions-Betrueungsoffizier or officer-mentors. They conducted propaganda on a more subtle level, being able to present their defeats as tactical retreats or even special operations, the term “elastic front” was even coined. These were the same Wehrmacht officers, but passed the approval of the NSDAP commission under the direct supervision of the head of the party office, Martin Bormann. From the beginning of 1943, a full-fledged methodological journal “Was uns bewegt” began to be published for new divisional and army commanders, which in German means “What moves us”.
After the crushing defeat of the Wehrmacht army and the Axis armies near Stalingrad in February 1942, Goebbels was stunned, invoked the tactics of his own propaganda machine far ahead, corrected mistakes and began to act more broadly. Paulus explained the defeat of the armies of Richthofen, Manstein and other elite units by the fact that “the Russians attacked from all sides, but the soldiers of the Reich died heroically, one and all.” He remained silent about the surrender of nearly 100,000 Germans, and many days of mourning were declared in Germany, where Wagner’s music played everywhere.
Goebbels’ assistant, Dr. As Werner Naumann wrote: “Our propaganda has returned to us.” What does “on the fingers” mean? The gap between truth and falsehood was so great that the last year of the war was marked by an epidemic of “massive capitulations” of enemy formations, and a wave of suicides broke out in Berlin. Until that moment, many thought that the Soviet army had long been forced beyond the Urals. And when the soldier of the Red Army entered Berlin, he did not look like a “steppe bastard” at all and was in no hurry to kill and rape any civilians from right to left. HE
Meanwhile, the legend of the brutality of the Soviet military will become incredibly popular in the Western world during the Cold War, and in Russia in the 90s, where many values, including the magnitude of the victory, will be questioned. II. World War.
The author’s view may not coincide with the editors’ position.
Author biography:
Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a military observer for socialbites.ca, a retired colonel.
He graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-aircraft Missile School (1976).),
Air Defense Military Command Academy (1986)).
Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile battalion (1980-1983)).
Deputy Commander of the Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment (1986-1988)).
Senior officer of the Air Defense Forces Main Staff (1988-1992)).
General Staff Main Operations Directorate Officer (1992-2000)).
Graduate of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (1998).
Columnist for Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2000-2003)), editor-in-chief of the Military Industrial Courier newspaper (2010-2015).