On December 12, 1979, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU made the final decision to send troops to Afghanistan. Surprisingly, many documents were clear on how the decision was made during the years of perestroika. However, history has managed to acquire some clichés/myths. But partially the stamps turned out to be true. But only partially.
Now they like to emphasize that the decision was of a collective nature and was made after fierce debate and despite the objections of authoritative members of the leadership. It is neither so nor so.
The first request to bring in troops came in early 1979 from Nur-Mohammad Taraki, General Secretary of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (there were almost dozens at the time). A year ago, for some reason, he overthrew King David, with whom the USSR had excellent relations, and announced that he would build socialism. Until this April revolution, Moscow was neither a dream nor a soul, but rejoiced: another country took the road to socialism.
Party ideologues (Suslov, Ponomarev) immediately took up the idea that Afghanistan could become “our” socialist country, like Mongolia, which in the USSR they said was constantly “moving from feudalism to socialism”.
Taraki managed to visit Moscow, kiss Brezhnev and sign an agreement on friendship, good neighborliness and cooperation. However, the PDPA was clearly unable to deal with the Mujahideen uprising that broke out under the banner of Islamism.
Initial and many subsequent requests to bring troops to Moscow were met negatively. Criticism of the idea in the Politburo was unanimous: They say, how can we oppose the Afghan people. The smug Brezhnev wasn’t too keen on the idea either. Meanwhile, similar requests kept coming, including Hafizullah Amin, who later overthrew and strangled Taraki according to the best Eastern traditions. It also shot another ten thousand people, including those accustomed to it in the Kremlin. Leonid Ilyich and the Kremlin as a whole did not like this at all. They never loved like this. How so?! without asking!
In the summer of 1979, Moscow was even ready to send up to 2,000 paratroopers to Kabul, when Amin, still an ally of Taraki, appealed to various Soviet representatives with requests to send troops.
But after the coup carried out by Amin in the fall, the situation turned completely disastrous, and Amin himself was already literally shouting for help. Various factors contributed to the “maturation” of Brezhnev and his associates. There are not only personal denials of Amin, who strangled the person with whom Leonid Ilyich kissed a year ago, but also rumors that the new ruler of Afghanistan is allegedly ready to sniffle with the Americans. Whether they were right is a big question, but it played the role of a red rag for the bull. The Soviet gerontocracy, of course, was heavily indoctrinated. Plus, he fears that the green jihad flag will be handed over to the Soviet republics in Central Asia.
The KGB most likely greatly exaggerated in its reports the extent to which Amin flirted with Americans, which perhaps played a decisive role. In this part, in the USSR it was always believed that it is better to overdo it. As a result, ideological dogmas outweighed measured calculations.
As a result, a “narrow Politburo” was formed, consisting of Brezhnev, Suslov (the head of ideology), Andropov (the head of the KGB, had experience in suppressing the uprising in Hungary in 1956), Ustinov (minister of defense), Gromyko (the foreign ministry). He decided to enter Afghanistan. Of the candidates for membership in the Politburo, only Ponomarev was invited to the decisive meeting of the Afghanistan commission as curator of relations with the communist and workers’ parties of the West and the left movements of the third world countries. The decision was purely political: to set America against the backdrop of its rapprochement with China at the time, to “stop jihad” in distant approaches, etc.
It is noteworthy that many soldiers were opposed to this: Chief of the General Staff Ogarkov, his first deputy Akhromeev, Head of the Main Operations Directorate Varennikov, Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces Pavlovsky. Prime Minister Kosygin was also against it. But purely military and economic considerations were left aside.
When Chief of Staff Field Marshal Ogarkov dared to object to the idea of bringing in troops, Defense Minister Marshal Ustinov snapped: “Are you going to lecture the Politburo? All you have to do is follow orders…”
Or, as the former US ambassador, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Dobrynin recalled: “When the highest ranks of generals – Ogarkov, Akhromeev, Varennikov – turned to Defense Minister Ustinov, they heard an annoying shout. In response: “Discuss. Follow the decision of the Politburo.”
The army also said that if we were to bring in soldiers, it would not bring 80,000 as agreed, but 300,000 at once to crush everyone and quickly. But they decided – a “limited” unit.
The Defense Council, which was supposed to be involved in the development of such decisions under the 1977 Constitution, was not involved in deciding neither on bringing in troops nor on their use in Afghanistan. None of their meetings from 1976 to 1990 dealt with issues related to the entry and presence of soldiers in the country.
How was the decision framed? Not possible. There was a report from the meeting on 12 December. Where there is no “sending troops to Afghanistan”, the country has no name, nothing. There is a confirmed term “events”.
Here it was, word for word: “Confirm the points and activities outlined in Volumes 1. Andropov Yu.V., Ustinov DF, Gromyko AA Allow them to make unprincipled adjustments in the implementation of these measures. Matters requiring a Central Committee resolution must be communicated to the Politburo in a timely manner. implementation will be transferred to TT Andropova Yu.V., Ustinova DF, Gromyko AA
2. Instruct TT. Yu.V. Central Committee Secretary Brezhnev LI “
Legally, there was no formalization – neither the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council (as ordered by the Constitution), neither the decision of the Council of Ministers, nor the decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Although at the time it was a very representative collegiate body: 287 members and 139 candidates for Central Committee members. And there may be objections. Nothing. Everything is verbal.
Only on December 24, 1979, Ustinov will sign the directive, which states: “It has been decided that some Soviet troops stationed in the southern regions of our country will be brought to assist the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan”. create favorable conditions for the prohibition of possible anti-Afghan actions from neighboring states as well as friendly Afghan people. It turned out to be Ustinov from the army, they “decided” everything.
Only in June 1980, the general assembly of the Central Committee of the CPSU issued a resolution in which it “fully approved the measures taken to provide comprehensive assistance to Afghanistan, to repel armed attacks and foreign intervention, the purpose of which is to suppress the Afghan revolution and a pro-imperialist military on the southern borders of the USSR. Build an attack base.”
No one thought it would take ten years and kill 15,000 Soviet soldiers. Moreover, as early as February, Brezhnev gave instructions to draw up a decision on the withdrawal of troops before the end of 1980. But it quickly became clear that this was impossible.
The Americans immediately closed the mousetrap and did everything so that the Soviet troops did not stand in the garrisons, but were not involved in nationwide hostilities. At the time, no one thought (and neither did anyone in America) that this would be the beginning of Osama bin Laden’s “career”.
It is often said about the Afghan war that it became one of the causes of the crisis and the collapse of the USSR. But over time, such a statement of the question seems like an exaggeration.
The USSR could not only wage a relatively untensioned regional war, albeit unsuccessfully, but even risk losing the war without serious consequences for the regime. The “Afghan factor” was of course a cause for concern in society – at the level of “how the man was not taken to Afghanistan”, but nothing more. The news picture was completely checked, no “unnecessary news” reached the townspeople. The losses were heavy, yes. But after all they were “stained” for 10 years.
Was the anti-war movement at the forefront even when glasnost and perestroika began? Not at all. They debated and excited about the crimes of Stalinism, opened the “dark pages of history”, tested the limits of publicity. They built some kind of castles in the air in the economy, mostly in the form of dreams. In the national republics, no one cared about the “tragic fate of the Afghan people”, especially refugees. It was much more important to insist that the word Tallinn should have two “n”s at the end. The war in Afghanistan during the perestroika period was of course discussed and criticized by some, but it was certainly not at the forefront anywhere.
The sanctions imposed on the USSR “for Afghanistan” are nothing compared to the current sanctions.
They forbade buying American grain, so they bought it from other countries. Well, they boycotted the Moscow Olympics, so all the same, in addition to athletes from socialist countries and the third world, many athletes came from the West. From a technological point of view, the USSR was self-sufficient and did not need any chips at that time.
The USSR, in which the fall in oil prices and attempts to “ban on vodka” played a much larger role than the Afghan war, collapsed due to the stalemate of economic policy. And also “national identity parades” due to landslides. In a territorial war, no matter how adventurous he was at the time – and it was just an adventure – he certainly wouldn’t push himself too hard. I think the Soviet leadership would sooner or later come to the decision to withdraw troops without Gorbachev. Fully guided by military-political logic. And he didn’t get anything in return.
The author expresses his personal opinion, which may not coincide with the editors’ position.