space plane
The concept of a space plane, a spacecraft capable of landing and flying like an aircraft, predates the early Space Shuttle program in the United States. During the Second World War, German engineers explored the cosmospheric bomber Silbervogel, a design reminiscent of modern hypersonic gliders. These warheads would be propelled into space, skim the atmosphere, and descend again, repeating cycles to confuse defenses. The designers imagined the ability to strike New York from space and then touch down in Japan, a vision that highlighted both ambition and risk of early spaceflight concepts.
Postwar analyses soon revealed critical flaws. Silbervogel’s aerodynamics were not suited for reliable hypersonic flight, with the risk of catastrophic failure upon re-entry. In the early 1960s, the Dyna-Soar project attempted a similar path in the United States. It progressed to the late design stages and appeared feasible, yet the economics did not justify the effort: intercontinental ballistic capabilities, combined with a reusable platform, would be more expensive and complex than alternative approaches. The concept did not survive, and future spaceplane efforts shifted toward less contentious goals.
The Space Shuttle emerged from a broader U.S. space expansion strategy, which envisioned lunar bases, Mars missions, and a near-Earth orbital station requiring frequent launches. To curb the cost of delivering payloads, Lockheed engineers proposed a system that would launch only the fuel tank while the rest of the vehicle remained reusable. The fuel tank would be carried to orbit, refuelled by the engines, and then discarded as part of the return process.
In the wake of Apollo, the United States trimmed grand ambitions, retaining two main projects: an orbital station and the reusable shuttle. To meet military needs, the Shuttle design was expanded, with a large cargo bay able to carry a bus-sized payload and two solid rocket boosters that could be recovered after separation. The result was a system capable of reusability, but not without significant cost and complexity. Oxygen-hydrogen propulsion systems proved intricate, requiring meticulous inspection after each flight, and a single mission could carry price tags reaching billions of dollars. The overall development cost ran into the tens of billions at the time, leaving debates over the true savings of reuse.
A replica of the Space Shuttle?
The resemblance between Buran and the Space Shuttle is evident, and Soviet designers acknowledged that Buran was conceived as a counterbalance to the American program. During the 1971–75 period, analytical studies by the Institute of Applied Mathematics of the USSR Academy of Sciences and NPO Energia identified a need for a reusable space system to deter potential adversaries. Technological optimism and geopolitical rivalry framed the push for a Soviet counterpart.
Voicing concerns about the strategic implications, Vyacheslav Filin, a deputy chief designer, argued that operationalizing a reusable space system could enable a preemptive capability to attack key targets. This perspective reflected the tense atmosphere of the Cold War and the belief that orbital assets might become strategic weapons.
Cold War misinterpretations shaped early assessments on both sides. Soviet experts questioned the Shuttle’s economic viability and its oversized cargo capacity, interpreting the program as primarily aimed at weaponizing space. While the American Shuttle operated under NASA’s civilian umbrella, it carried military payloads in practice, such as reconnaissance satellites, though declassified records do not show an explicit plan to use the Shuttle as an attack platform. The most aggressive notion was merely to relocate orbital assets in space rather than wage war from orbit.
In 1976, the Soviet defense minister approved a reusable space system with capacity aligned to the Shuttle. NPO Energia, building the launch vehicle for orbital aircraft, modeled its work on the U.S. layout, but technical consensus remained that direct copying would be counterproductive. Academician Valentin Glushko stated clearly that the Soviet side would not imitate the American Shuttle, emphasizing distinctive engineering choices and strategic aims.
Buran can be seen as an equivalent concept to the Shuttle, but its implementation diverged. Its main engines were arranged differently, using four oxygen-kerosene engines rather than the central propulsion arrangement used by the Shuttle. This choice reflected engine performance and materials science limitations of the time. Energia, the core launch vehicle, gained independence from Buran and could be used for other missions as well.
Without large solid-fuel boosters, Soviet designers pursued liquid-fuel solutions, notably the RD-170 engine, one of the most powerful liquid rockets ever built. Four such engines, arranged around the central stage of Energia, provided necessary thrusts. The recovery of boosters remained a challenge, but early plans aimed to develop methods to salvage engine components after ocean landings. In the end, Buran’s first and only unmanned flight in 1988 demonstrated fully automated capability, including autonomous runway landing, a feat that outpaced many later drone technologies. By contrast, the Space Shuttle’s landings remained hand-controlled for much longer periods.
Was there a need to revive Buran? Soviet designers shifted emphasis away from reusability as a primary goal, focusing instead on the ability to launch a Shuttle-like payload and crew into orbit. Modern rocket design often prioritizes fully autonomous, unmanned payloads where feasible, a trend that reduces risk and complexity for certain missions. The Shuttle and Buran did enable significant orbital assembly tasks, including deploying satellites like the Hubble Space Telescope and constructing space stations, achievements that proved the practicality of spaceflight design even when costs were high.
Cost considerations remain central. The idea of reusability carried prestige, but the economics did not always justify continuous high-frequency launches. Analysts have noted that the Shuttle program required many launches to achieve economies of scale, an objective not met in practice. Industry voices, including Roscosmos officials, have observed that high-volume usage is a prerequisite for meaningful reuse benefits. The contemporary direction points to new generations of reusable systems, with SpaceX’s Starship seen as a philosophical successor to the Shuttle, aiming to simplify fuel and engine reuse through methane propulsion and streamlined processes. NASA views Starship as a potential vehicle for lunar missions under the Artemis program. The path forward remains iterative, building on the lessons of past programs to inform safer, more cost-effective exploration.
Thus, the legacy of both the Shuttle and Buran endures: they spurred innovation and opened paths to modern design strategies, even if the exact systems were eventually retired. The evolution continues, guided by the pursuit of reliable, economical access to space and the enduring goal of expanding humanity’s reach beyond Earth.