The latest U.S. military assistance package to Ukraine comprises air defense radars, counterbattery radars, Mi-17 helicopters, vehicles, anti-tank weapons, artillery munitions and the M142 HIMARS multiple launch rocket system. The total value of the package is reported at $700 million.
Within this package, a particular emphasis rests on the HIMARS system, a highly mobile and versatile artillery rocket system designed for rapid deployment and flexible fire missions. The HIMARS concept evolved from the FMTV wheeled chassis with a fighting load around five tons and has been showcased as a modular solution adaptable to varied operational needs.
President Joe Biden’s decision to provide HIMARS to Ukraine has influenced broader regional considerations, prompting discussions about re-export patterns within alliance structures. Following Washington, the United Kingdom announced the transfer of M270 MLRS launchers to Kyiv, noting coordination with the United States.
The M270 MLRS, a heavyweight launcher, shares its role with HIMARS but rides on a different base platform, sporting a crawler chassis derived from the Bradley fighting vehicle. This makes MLRS a more substantial variant of the same family, capable of delivering larger batches of missiles when required.
Both MLRS and HIMARS use two main families of ammunition. First, the MLRS Ordnance Family (MFOM), consisting of unguided and guided rockets with ranges typically between 40 and 80 kilometers.
Second, the Army TACMS Ordnance Family (AFOM) munitions, which include tactical ballistic missiles with ranges generally from 165 to 300 kilometers, and, according to some reports, potentially up to 400 kilometers. Official data on AFOM deployment remains limited.
Globally, the M270 MLRS is in service in 17 countries, with several states connected to Ukraine-related defense dialogues. Poland has reportedly requested a substantial purchase of M270 MLRS systems from the United States, suggesting that part of such an order could be re-exported to Ukraine.
Consequently, the pathway for MLRS support to Ukraine, described in some discussions as a “Danish variant,” involves intermediary steps through partner nations. For instance, during a later gathering of a Ukraine-focused group at a Ramstein-era base, it was noted that Denmark would transfer RGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship missiles to Ukraine.
As a result, direct attribution to the United States for certain deployments can become a matter of interpretation in the public narrative.
Contemporary Russian air defense and surface-to-air systems, including S-400, S-350, S-300PM2 and the Buk family, possess non-strategic air defense capabilities that could challenge expanded use of American MLRS ammunition. The cost of anti-air missiles within these systems is a notable consideration, and their application at large scale would entail substantial expense.
One tactical avenue to counter MLRS involves air superiority measures, though such operations require aircraft to be airborne or stationed nearby with rapid reaction times. The moment the launch is initiated, MLRS and HIMARS can quickly disengage from their firing positions, complicating follow-up targeting.
Another perspective considers enhancing Russian countermeasures with systems like the Smerch family, which, with standard missiles, can reach about 120 kilometers, potentially extending beyond some US launcher ranges.
Ultimately, strategies aim to ensure that M142 and M270 systems do not become vulnerable at critical lines of communication, including rail hubs, bridges, tunnels and power-related infrastructure. Potential attack vectors include sea- and air-delivered cruise missiles alongside other aviation assets.
Scholarly and strategic analyses emphasize that neutralizing the M142 and M270 requires integrated action across various platforms. The assessments suggest a multi-domain approach would be necessary to impact the effectiveness of these launchers in Ukraine.
Notes in this text reflect a particular viewpoint and may not align with editorial opinions.
Source attributions: The analysis draws on publicly available defense assessments and expert commentary used for strategic context and is intended to illustrate perspectives on MLRS deployments and countermeasures. [Citation: Defense analysis framework, publicly shared assessments, and expert commentary.]