According to senior U.S. officials, Ukraine will likely need to acquire F-16 fighter jets or other fourth-generation aircraft in the future. In the near term, however, partners should prioritize transferring air defense systems, missiles, and armored vehicles to Kyiv. There is concern within the U.S. military that Russia’s robust air defense could inflict unacceptable damage on any new fighters once they arrive in Ukrainian service.
The issue is not only about potential losses of aircraft but also about reputational costs. Washington believes that American weapons are among the best in the world, and sending them to the Ukrainian Armed Forces could shift the trajectory of the conflict. A setback for the F-16, a landmark in light fighter design and widely used, might undermine the aircraft’s global standing and the narrative of U.S. leadership in military technology.
For the F-16 Fighting Falcon to operate effectively in contested Ukrainian airspace, the package would need to include electronic warfare aircraft and accompanying support aircraft, with coordinated transfers (for example, one EW platform per F-16, totaling two squadrons). The plan would also call for suppressing enemy air defenses, forming fighter groups equipped with anti-radiation missiles and glide bombs to strike launch positions without entering active air-defense zones, and providing the Ukrainian Air Force with radio and electronic reconnaissance assets.
When these conditions are in place, the F-16 could perform well in Ukraine. If the transfer of a full fighter squadron remains an extended process, potentially taking 18–24 months, the delivery of supporting platforms and additional capabilities could be postponed even longer.
The clock, meanwhile, is running down for Ukraine’s military and political leadership. As a result, the ongoing spring offensive will likely rely on Western-supplied weapons and equipment already in Ukrainian hands.
Traditional military doctrine often begins with air operations or a sequence of large-scale strikes. At present, Ukraine does not have the means to execute such an air campaign at scale. While the Ukrainian air force has retained much of its combat capability during the conflict, its numerical strength remains limited.
The Ukrainian leadership may see a broad offensive as a way to disrupt the adversary’s command and control on day one, degrade air and missile defense groups, and disrupt ground forces and logistics. The objective would be to hit command centers, communications hubs, and ammunition depots first and foremost.
There is reason to expect Kyiv to stockpile long-range munitions such as JDAM-ER guided bombs and air-launched or ground-launched munitions like GLSDB and M142 missiles. Western-supplied platforms such as HIMARS and M270 MRLS would be central to deep operations. The potential for the U.K. to provide air-launched missiles like Storm Shadow/SCALP could extend reach against targets in the rear. Long-range artillery, including extended-range guided projectiles, would contribute to shaping the front-line, enabling precision strikes on important objectives.
Following a major, precision-focused strike phase, armored and mechanized formations, largely built around Western armored vehicles, would push from the operational edge. The vast southern steppes of Ukraine offer wide avenues for rapid maneuver by Ukrainian tanks and mechanized units. Reserve formations and reconnaissance groups would likely be tasked with bypassing resistance nodes, pushing toward coastal areas by the Sea of Azov, and targeting pockets of enemy resistance in a piecemeal fashion. The ultimate aims of Kyiv’s counteroffensive have been discussed publicly, including operations around Berdyansk, Mariupol, Melitopol, and potential access toward Luhansk, depending on the evolving conditions on the ground.
The southern terrain, flat and open, poses challenges for defensive setups, and the Russian command would be attentive to exploit any exposed positions. Still, it appears the Russian side is monitoring these moves and preparing appropriate responses to anticipated Ukrainian actions.