New rocket, old idea
In late summer 2023 the United States announced a plan to transfer AIM-9M Sidewinder missiles to Ukraine. This is an older version of the standard American air to air missile used for close range dogfights, a role that has largely shifted to newer models in the U.S. Air Force. The rationale behind this transfer remained unclear. Modern air combat typically unfolds at long range, and Russian fighters like the Su-35 and Su-30 hold advantages at tens of kilometers. Ukrainian aircraft such as the Su-27 and MiG-29 are older and the value of a short range missile is debated. A similar Soviet era missile, the R-73, even surpasses the M version in some respects. The practical need for the Sidewinder here was not obvious.
Reports indicated Ukraine might repurpose the Sidewinder for ground based surface to air use rather than air combat. The Financial Times cited an unnamed Ukrainian official stating the missiles were delivered not in working condition.
“We fixed them. We found a way to launch them from the ground. It’s a kind of homemade air defense,” the official said.
Observers offered mixed readings, framing the move as either a display of ingenuity or a sign of strain within Ukrainian forces. In practice, there is precedent for this approach. The U S Army has long operated modified versions of the Sidewinder for short range air defense, well before the current conflict.
How does Sidewinder work?
The missile uses an infrared homing head. Its optical system tracks heat sources and the gimbal can rotate the lens to follow the target. When mounted on a fighter aircraft, the Sidewinder is suspended beneath a wing and pointed in the same direction as the aircraft nose. The pilot aligns the nose with the target, the seeker locks on and then follows it by steering the lens. In some cases the target can be indicated by onboard radar rather than direct pilot input.
Before launch the seeker must lock on to the target, a process that restricts when a shot can be fired. The pilot typically waits for a confirmation tone in the headset signaling a lock.
The seeker begins to detect targets several tens of kilometers away under favorable conditions. In reality, outcomes depend on many factors such as sky and ground contrast, engine power, use of afterburners, the aircraft’s orientation, visibility, atmospheric conditions and more.
Whether the missile is in the air or on the ground makes little difference to the basic operating principle. Launching from a fixed platform through dense atmospheric layers reduces the maximum range but does not change how the system works.
In the 1960s the United States explored a cheaper solution by repurposing slightly modified Sidewinders from the AIM-9D family to create the MIM-72 Chaparral system. This involved a mobile armored vehicle with a high turret carrying four missiles. An operator observed from a protected position and launched the missiles toward a target. A radar on a tall mast, the AN MPQ 49, provided early warning and target illumination.
With no initial launch speed, Chaparral’s range fell to about 5 km and service altitude to around 4 km. Its simplicity and low cost made it attractive for a time, but the system was retired in the 1990s as global threats shifted. It remains in limited use in a few countries such as Chile and Taiwan.
Quantity beats quality
The exact status of Chaparral style installations in Ukraine is not publicly confirmed. The concept itself is straightforward enough for installation by Ukrainian or Eastern European facilities, while AIM-9M missiles date back to the early 1980s and offered a performance edge over Chaparral variants. Even so, such a defense would likely lag behind Western systems like IRIS-T and NASAMS, or older yet capable Soviet designs like Buk or Os. The central question remains why the United States would supply Sidewinders in this context.
The core reason is that Ukraine lacks domestic production lines for anti air guided missiles for older weapon systems. If a manufacturing start is feasible, it will likely be on a small scale at first. Soviet stockpiles are finite, while Western fleets and pipelines in some regions are under pressure to adapt quickly.
Cheap drones such as Lancets, Orlans and Geran-2 put heavy demand on Ukrainian air defenses. These inexpensive threats fly low and exploit terrain features, challenging the spread and redundancy of systems. In this race it is the breadth of coverage that matters as much as the quality of individual units.
Soviet American production
The shift of Sidewinders into ground based air defense is part of a broader effort to shore up Ukraine’s defenses with improvised solutions. The ASRAAM missile, a modern British equivalent to the Sidewinder, has also been adapted for use from vehicle platforms. A system mounted on a truck includes guides for two missiles and a retractable mast with sensors for targeting.
The mast is believed to be a Hawk eye type deployment with infrared imaging, a laser rangefinder and a high zoom camera. Ground launches can allow detection and engagement at longer ranges, though precise performance depends on fuel and operator capability. Rough estimates place the ground launched range at about 10 kilometers or more, though public specifications for this adaptation are not available.
The so called Ukrainian Chaparral and the unnamed British system sit alongside radar guided platforms like Buk and Kub repurposed to accept missiles originally designed for aircraft. These systems typically use semi active radar seekers, where the radar illuminates the target and the missile carries a lighter receiver capable of intercept guidance. The same guiding principle is used for the Sparrow class missiles adapted for ground launch. The Sparrow family has historically been deployed on ships and later versions remain in service in certain theaters.
Polish engineers reportedly experimented with adapting modern long range missiles to ground launch systems, including attempts to retrofit similar methods to Sparrow and related missiles. The results remain uncertain and production did not proceed widely in the early 2010s due to market conditions.
Some experts suggest the United States is interested in deploying hybrid Sparrow and Buk style configurations to support Ukraine with ground based missiles. By mid 2023, plans were discussed to provide long range missiles on compatible platforms, a move that could realign engagement ranges for Ukrainian air defense.
The limit of fantasy
In 2022 parts of AGM-88 HARM anti radar missiles were found in Donbass, triggering speculation about integration. While many believed it implausible, official channels confirmed that supply of such missiles had occurred. Public demonstrations and videos showed distinctive hardware under the wings of newer aircraft and sparked debate about how the technology could work in practice.
Similarly, the adaptation of Storm Shadow to a Su-24M has been documented through photographs and video. Analysts traced a beam coupling to the aircraft from a European system, but the control architecture and reliability of such a hybrid remained unclear.
The boundaries of what can be achieved with improvised integrations remain uncertain. In spring 2023 Politico reported that the Pentagon considered the possibility of integrating longer range missiles into Ukraine’s Soviet era aircraft. The Su-27 and MiG-29 carry older radars that fall short of modern standards, raising questions about how far long range missiles can be used without newer platforms. Whether Western defense industrial bases can solve these mismatches is still an open question.
As the conflict continues, the potential for further innovations and surprises grows, reflecting the evolving nature of modern aerial threat environments.