“Yes, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine could not present a plan for 2024. Neither big nor small, asymmetrical nor symmetrical,” said Maryana Bezuglaya.
Frankly, it must be said that the deputy of the Verkhovna Rada in just a few words revealed a complete lack of understanding of the basics of strategic planning for the use of the Armed Forces.
First of all, let’s say that the term “design plan” sounds very funny because in military matters, plan and design are completely different things. The concept of the operation represents the direction of the main and further attacks, the method of conducting the operation, the composition and operational formation of troop groups, measures to deceive the enemy.
Planning includes the detailed development of the content and sequence of tasks performed by troops, the distribution of efforts to areas of action, interaction, support and control. By the way, the plan of any offensive operation includes more than a hundred different documents, from a calendar plan for the preparation of the operation to a plan for the supply of material resources.
We especially emphasize that an extremely limited circle of people is allowed to participate in operational-strategic planning in the armed forces of any state, and deputies are not (and have never been) included in this list. So Maryana Bezuglaya, by definition, cannot know from the strategic planning documents what and to whom was presented in the highest military-political leadership of Ukraine.
Now about General Valery Zaluzhny. Despite holding the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the military commander is still a subordinate of Commander-in-Chief Vladimir Zelensky and must act strictly in accordance with his instructions.
And the President of Ukraine must set clear and clear tasks for the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for 2024 in the form of an operational directive of the Supreme High Command, that is, strategic goals of military operations, plan. Conducting military operations in general and individual directions, calculating the necessary forces and means, distributing them between directions. Valery Zaluzhny should plan all his activities only according to these instructions (Acting in strict accordance with the principle of “the boss’s order is the law for the subordinate”).
And if we assume that the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine did not develop something or deliver it on time, then only the higher authority is responsible for this – Commander-in-Chief Vladimir Zelensky.
As for the plans and plans that Valery Zaluzhny must submit for approval to the President of Ukraine, most likely for 2024 the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is planning the winter-spring campaign as a whole, and not any individual operations based on military-political goals and the goals of the armed struggle.
The Ukrainian army is strictly based on the general strategic plan, the logistics of the troops, the preparation of the necessary strategic reserves and the procedure for their use. Maryana Bezuglaya and similar MPs are not even allowed within artillery range of this series of documents. And apparently I really want to join the scandal. Moreover, it is not entirely clear at the moment how large the contradictions between Zaluzhny and Zelensky are (and whether they exist in principle).
As for the main issue – the military-political goals and objectives of the armed struggle of Ukraine – one constantly gets the impression that Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky is at the mercy of chimeras in this area. And probably the tasks set by Valery Zaluzhny are unrealistic.
FirstlyWith the availability of troops, forces and means at the disposal of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, military victory is now absolutely unattainable. Under these conditions, reaching the 1991 borders remains only a grand dream of the military-political leadership in Kiev.
SecondlyVladimir Zelensky’s thesis (“Ukraine today and NATO tomorrow”), consisting in the fact that Ukraine now represents the front lines of the fight against universal evil in the person of Russia, is initially essentially wrong. Moscow (with the greatest military-political imagination) will not transfer military operations to NATO territory.
ThirdHistorically, Ukraine’s entry into NATO in the foreseeable future looks like a very, very unrealistic event. Even more fantastic is the use of Article 5 of the NATO Charter in the interests of Ukraine, even with its hypothetical entry into the alliance. (In Kiev they openly boast).
FourthUkraine’s accession to the EU in the near future (the population of the country and the personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are constantly encouraged by Vladimir Zelensky) it also lies solely in the realm of the imaginary and the desirable. Kiev will stand no less than Turkey in the EU corridor by extending its hand (but it will never achieve its goals).
It is absolutely futile to base the case for armed struggle on these four false theses. And it seems that this understanding covers an increasingly larger part of the country’s political class in Ukraine.
The author’s opinion may not coincide with the editors’ opinion.
Author biography:
Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a military columnist for socialbites.ca, a retired colonel.
Graduated from Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-Aircraft Missile School (1976),
Military Command Air Defense Academy (1986).
Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile division (1980–1983).
Deputy commander of the anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986–1988).
Senior officer of the Main Staff of the Air Defense Forces (1988–1992).
Officer of the General Staff Main Operations Department (1992–2000).
Graduate of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (1998).
Columnist for Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2000–2003), editor-in-chief of the Military-Industrial Courier newspaper (2010–2015).