If anyone could get into the minds of more than 140 million Russians, it’s British-born German historian Orlando Figes. Author of related works such as El baile de Natasha; Cultural history of Russia, or more recently History of Russia, recently invited to Barcelona by Fundació Catalunya Europa-Llegat Pasqual Maragall, Figes has the ability to examine the concerns and thoughts of Russian citizens with the precision of a surgeon. giant Eurasia reveals some facts that allow us to better understand its attitude towards the war in Ukraine and the militaristic orientation of its authorities.
Is Putin lying to justify the war in Ukraine?
These are half-truths and manipulated interpretations. They are not lying about the Russians because they really think Ukraine is part of Greater Russia, and that comes from the imperial vision of 19th century Russian historiography. But it doesn’t matter what the Russians think, because Ukraine has been independent since 1991.
How important was the traditional Russian passivity for the Kremlin to start the war?
This is a complex question. Passivity is deeply ingrained in Russia’s political culture and is a response to the collective memory of what happened during the Stalin era. But we know from the polls that it is popular to wage war in Russia. One of the things that holds Russia together is the idea that it is under attack, that the West is trying to tear it apart and that they must defend themselves.
What do Russians think of Ukrainians?
Usually they are also Slavs, slightly different, culturally inferior, but mainly us. Instead of writing new history books in 1991 (after the end of the USSR, NDR), the country went back to the 19th century and this sense of superiority over Ukrainians is the mentality that they can’t be trusted because they are half Catholic or half Catholic. They cooperated with the Poles or the Nazis who wanted to break away from Russia. The two economic and family relations are so close that it is difficult for Russians to accept that Ukrainians want to break up with them. In a way, the Russians envy the Ukrainians’ ability to progress, their sense of freedom, their deeper ties to Europe, and their greater individuality. Serfdom was not practiced throughout Ukraine. It was not completely occupied by the Mongols. Therefore, there are differences between the two countries that the Russians do not want to see. There’s talk of genocide, but I think it’s some kind of war punishment to someone cologne He said he had decided to leave. There is an element of punishment towards Ukrainians in the atrocities committed. daring wanting to abandon them, as the villagers were whipped in the past.
Is Putin looking at Stalin?
It’s very simple. Putin is a toxic mix of ideologies. He takes a lot from the whites (defenders of the tsarist regime during the Civil War after the NDR communist revolution), so he is an anti-Bolshevik; So did the philosophers of Eurasianism and the pro-Slavic thinkers of the 19th century. There is definitely an element of Stalinism: he is a KGB man, a product of Stalin’s system and very attached to his concept of social control. He is also a neo-Stalinist in his vision of Russia as an empire.
Given the military defeats, does Russia have a chance to rethink this imperialist idea?
Putin can declare victory at any time as long as he retains the territory he controls. He conquered as much as he could, and now he will defend it. I don’t think anyone in the Russian government thought the fall of the Zelensky government was possible. This facilitates the transition from the maximalist plan to the minimalist plan, which would include the preservation of the four conquered republics. The Russians control most of the lands east of the Dnipro River. And they can draw a line there. This fed not the imperialist idea, but the Russian national idea, which always saw the Donbas as a historical region.
Could the disastrous military campaign lead to the disintegration of the Russian Federation?
As Russia suffered defeats and Ukraine was so successful, Kiev’s goals became radicalized. There are people in the Zelensky Administration who claim that under the idea of decolonization Russia is inherently aggressive and expansionist. And the only way to stop it is to split it up.
It could be?
No. Separatist movements may arise in Chechnya, Dagestan, but the main ethnic minority – the Tatars – is in the middle of Russia and it is difficult to imagine that a state could be formed there.
After seeing what was seen in Putin’s Russia, was there a real democratic transition in the 1990s?
There was no transition. Essentially, it was a transfer of power, with the communists making themselves as comfortable as possible in post-communist Russia. There was no trial. The FSB emerged from the KGB with little change or even increased powers. And they came to power with Putin. The West bears some responsibility as it is not interested in building a civil society. What Russia needed was a Marshall plan that included investments to sustain the infrastructure and welfare state to lay the foundation for creating real capitalism. Instead, there was the shock therapy and equity loan scandal that created an undemocratic oligarchy. Many turned away from democracy because they lost everything.
Do you think that the cause of democracy in Russia is doomed?
I don’t know. But even if free elections are held, the winner will probably be Putin or another Putin. The idea that the Russians will one day wake up thinking they should vote for opponents like Garry Kasparov or Alexei Navalni will not come true. Yes, many people left Russia. But this has already happened to two million people after the Bolshevik revolution in 1917. Many said they would return soon, but the regime did not change. And those who returned for patriotic reasons were in bad shape: either gulag or political prostitution.