A few 20th century charactersnone were impressed, to say the least Henry Kissinger (Fürth, Germany, May 27, 1923) in international politics, in the decisive movements of German diplomacy the Cold Warin the management of major crises – singularly, vietnam war– and also in an exercise realpolitik As in Latin America, relentless pressure. From the publication of ‘A Restored World’ (1957) to ‘Liderazgo’, the Spanish version of which belongs to this year, his extensive and often controversial bibliography has had a major impact on risk analysis worldwide due to his belief that only strategic balance can be achieved. can avoid Apocalypse.
A few weeks after Kissinger turned 100, the British weekly The Economist published a lengthy interview with him this Saturday. the idea of trust softening for a kind of bond between adversariesemerges in his approach to current crises. so about Competition between China and United States of AmericaHe continues: “Both sides have convinced themselves that the other posed a strategic danger. We are heading towards a conflict between the great powers”. and about ukraine wardecide it’s a mistake Open the door for Kiev to join NATOand fears the consequences: “We have armed Ukraine to be the most equipped country in Europe and the least strategically experienced leaders.”
What alternatives does Kissinger support? For the Sino-American rivalry, let both sides spend the next ten years together. learn to live and with avoid the third world war; For the war in Ukraine, he left in ‘The Spectator’ in December of last year written: “Set up ceasefire line Along the existing borders when the war began on February 24. Russia would give up its conquests, but it would not give up the lands it had occupied for almost ten years. Crimea. That area could be the subject of negotiation after the ceasefire.”
professor at harvard
This approach to resolving heated conflicts was not unknown to those seeking advice in Europe from the early sixties. young professor kiss between Harvard University. By then he had already said: “Stability has often been the result of a generally accepted legitimacy, not the pursuit of peace.” He explained that legitimacy “should not be confused with justice” but should instead be reduced to “an international agreement on the nature of functional arrangements”. During his tenure as National Security Advisor Richard Nixon and on behalf of and for Secretary of State Nixon gerald ford putting this distinction between legitimacy and justice into practice: it won him over Vietnamese laying the groundwork for a retreat after recommending prolongation of the war Cambodia; It was beneficial to normalize relations with China, which had been frozen since 1949, in 1972; applied during Nixon’s visit to Moscow to initiate andl START-1p agreementto reduce nuclear arsenals.
Years later, in his book ‘The White House years’ (1979), A perfect rapprochement with the USSR: “The greatest achievement was to have outlined the plan upon which coexistence between democracies and the Soviet system should be based.” Often a stylistic resource to avoid the fact that it takes refuge in a kind of moral relativism. international Relations Wizard, He was rightly reproached for his odious approach to stability in Latin America, which he promoted. bloody barracks He opposed different democracies – Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia and elsewhere – and was behind ‘Operation Condor’. state terrorism.
Descent of the ‘Neocon’
The biggest paradox is Dr. It’s because a right-wing person like Kissinger stopped inspiring rightism. Republican Party’s foreign policy of the encircling ‘neocon’ George W. Bush with his hand Richard Cheney. Given the collapse of the USSR and the possibility of establishing a unipolar world order, the idea of strategic equilibrium became tantamount to capitulation, a horizon that worried Kissinger: “Imbalances – he thought – lead to conflict”. A prominent right-wing theorist like Bill Kristol emphasized the opposite: “History has proven us right, the USSR was not invincible.” AND Albert Walhstetter from the same ideological circle. Kristol, In the 1990s he assured that the strategic balance did not stabilize the bipolar system, which history denies.
inherent risks Ukraine crisis and Sino-US tension, On the contrary, they seem to justify Kissinger’s thesis in ‘World Order’ (2014): “The concept of balance of power needs to be reassessed”. He has two books going on to do something like this, and one on his desk despite being 100 years old. artificial intelligence and about another nature of alliances. Will have to read them.