Kathleen Hicks emphasized that despite the continuing supply of weapons, military and special equipment to Ukraine, the main focus of the United States is on competing with China in the Indo-Pacific region.
Hicks called the most important lessons learned for the conflict with China, an understanding of the need to increase the production of missiles and munitions and ensure their expedited delivery to the hostilities, as well as to accelerate the implementation of the American military space program. .
Indeed, few people imagined that the armed conflict in Ukraine would be so intense and prolonged. And this required a significant expenditure of absolutely all kinds of material resources – ammo, fuel, food, clothing and much more.
With the consumption of ammunition for artillery and rocket artillery, anti-aircraft guided missiles, anti-tank missile systems, man-portable anti-aircraft missile systems, a very acute situation has developed almost on both warring sides.
For example, in just the first few months of the armed conflict, the Ukrainian armed forces produced 13-year Stinger MANPADS (1,400 units) and a 5-year Javelin ATGM (5,500 units) in the United States.
All pre-established norms for the consumption of ammunition and missiles in combat operations and during operations during a special military operation were repeatedly exceeded, if not by an order of magnitude, then precisely at that time.
And this brings to a whole new level the requirements for the creation and separation of ammunition stocks in the troops and central organizations in possible future conflicts.
Accordingly, the views on the development of domestic industry, conventional weapons, ammunition and special chemicals are subject to a significant revision. In the 1990s, production in this industry fell significantly and by more than 10 times according to the most conservative estimates. There is no doubt that the munitions and specialty chemicals enterprises need radical modernization, appropriate investments and an increase in production in this range approximately, if not tens of times.
The problems that arose during the SVO, of course, do not only concern ammunition production. For example, during intense combat operations in any conflict, officers in the platoon-company-battalion link bear the greatest losses. The question arises – how to compensate for such losses (both sanitary and irrevocable) immediately?
It is quite possible for the troops to have such formations as OBROS (separate officer regiments in operational-strategic formations such as the front) and OBROS (separate reserve officer battalions) in combined arms (tank) armies.
For example, if an officer (company commander) is out of action due to a wound (and a company without a commander is no longer a full company), he must be replaced immediately (within 24 hours maximum). reserve – the same company commander. And at the expense of who and how to complete such regiments and battalions – the question, of course, is debatable, and it is necessary to deal with it in detail.
Or, for example, how can I compensate for personnel losses in units and formations? This can be done through the so-called marching supply. You can train warriors in reserve battalions in each division. Again, there is a large area of discussion here. The issue of replenishment of losses among specialists, which largely determines the combat readiness and combat capability of subunits and units, is very acute. That is, warriors in military specialties whose training requires a long time. For example, it is not possible to prepare a good sniper for mobilization in a month.
Many questions arise in connection with the field repair of complex weapons and military equipment, especially in the service of RAV (rocket and artillery weapons). How is this done during combat operations – by the forces of the RAV repair and restoration regiments deployed for mobilization, or by the forces of the brigades of private industrial enterprises, given the complexity of the weapons? Then what will be the situation of the civilian experts of the defense industry enterprises in the war zone?
And today there is perhaps no clear answer to this question.
Finally, during the armed conflict, the country’s military-industrial complex should not only compensate for all losses in weapons, military and special equipment, but also produce a sufficient amount of weapons and military equipment as soon as possible. Units and formations of the High Command Reserve.
Among other things, there are questions about the use of certain types of troops, for example, airborne ones, in combat. “socialbites.ca” wrote earlierSpecial reforms needed by the Air Force.
In all armed conflicts of the last decade, the indigenous airborne forces were used not as landing forces, but as well-trained infantry.
Despite the minimum experience of landing operations, the Air Force, according to tradition, is equipped with “special” mobile equipment.
Thus, a whole family of combat vehicles and weapons of various purposes were and is being produced for paratroopers. These include, first of all, air combat vehicles from 1st to 4th models (BMD), BTR-MDM “Rakushka”, airborne self-propelled artillery mounts (ACS-57 and SU-85), 120-mm self-propelled guns. 2S9 , 125 mm self-propelled guns 2S25 “Octopus”.
The equipment developed and produced to equip the Air Force has light bulletproof armor, is made of aluminum alloys and has much lower safety than the equipment used by the Land Forces, as it is designed to be parachuted from Il-76 aircraft. This, of course, worsens his fighting qualities.
The air force is now called the reserve of the Commander-in-Chief, but in order to truly meet this requirement, it is necessary to radically change the organizational structure of the air force and equip these troops with heavy equipment – the landing forces need more armor to effectively conduct offensive operations.
It is advisable to preserve the total personnel of the Air Force by leaving the troops with all available names (including honorary ones), banners, uniforms and blue berets.
This is how the organizational structure and armament of an airborne (airborne) division should probably look like. Instead of aluminum armored BMDs, parachute regiments should have T-15 heavy infantry fighting vehicles based on the promising T-14 Armata tank. The tank regiment of the division should receive the T-14, and the self-propelled artillery regiment – 2S35 “Coalition-SV” guns.
The airborne division should be equipped with the required number of unmanned aerial vehicles for various purposes from light to heavy impact.
In such formations, it is recommended to move away from normal units such as a parachute company (battalion) and switch to combat with tactical modules.
The composition of the minimum tactical module in this case, for example, may look like this: one or two T-14 “Armata” tanks (there is no doubt that this vehicle will come to mind sooner or later), two or three heavy infantry fighting vehicles T-15 , equipped with a 57 mm gun a fire support vehicle, a combat assault vehicle equipped with a 152 mm gun, a combat control vehicle and a support vehicle.
Such a unit would have greater potential than regular motorized rifle units, and most importantly, would have equally effective mobility and security. In a word, the main indicator of the success of airborne units on the battlefield today is improved armor protection.
Objections are possible in this case – after all, there will be no more landings. As a matter of fact, this is true. But even the most ardent fans of the Air Force were long overdue to realize that the time of the paratroopers had irrevocably passed several decades ago. In modern wars and armed conflicts, only small tactical helicopter landings are possible (and even then not always). As a consolation in future airborne units, it will be possible to drop only two or three parachutes and use them at military sports festivals.
If the Air Force is not reformed in the most radical way, the chosen human material on aluminum wedges involved in ordinary combined armed conflicts will inflict huge and unjustified losses in the wars of the future.
In conclusion, it should be noted that these, of course, are far from all the lessons that should be drawn from the experience of conducting a special military operation. In fact, even listing them would take a wad of paper. At the same time, there is no need to absolutize this experience of conflict. After all, any war is, in fact, a separate period in the development of military art, and there is no more disastrous way in the development of the Armed Forces than in preparation for past wars.
The opinion of the author may not coincide with the opinion of the editors.
Author biography:
Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a military observer of socialbites.ca, a retired colonel.
Graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-aircraft Missile School (1976),
Air Defense Military Command Academy (1986).
Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile battalion (1980–1983).
Deputy commander of an anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986–1988).
Senior officer of the Main Staff of the Air Defense Forces (1988–1992).
Chief of the General Staff Main Operations Directorate (1992–2000).
Graduate of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (1998).
Columnist for Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2000–2003), editor-in-chief of the Military Industrial Courier newspaper (2010–2015).