From April 3 of this year, the Russian side will begin to train the Belarusian air force crews (more precisely, this branch of the armed forces in the republic is called the Air Force and Air Defense Forces). Ten carrier aircraft of the military aviation of Alexander Lukashenko have already been prepared for the use of tactical nuclear weapons. This was announced by Russian President Vladimir Putin on March 25.
It should be emphasized right away that Russia did not transfer tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus (some of the republicans hastened to report this and have already drawn nuclear mushrooms over Warsaw and Vilnius), but placed them only on the territory of Belarus.
Special ammunition will be used only according to the plan of the Supreme Commander of the Russian Armed Forces, Vladimir Putin. It is the President of Russia, and he alone, who will give the order, if necessary, to unlock nuclear warheads (nuclear warheads) and use these weapons of mass destruction.
Apparently, it will be received by a missile brigade (rbr) stationed on the territory of Belarus, equipped with one of the aviation regiments, which will be armed with special warheads, Iskander-M operational-tactical systems and TNW carrier aircraft. In the latter case, it is possible for aviators to receive free-falling nuclear aerial bombs (of various capacities in TNT equivalent).
In this context, it is logical to assume that two storage facilities for tactical nuclear weapons will be built (it would be more correct to call them special facilities). Most likely, one of them will be deployed within the area of the Iskander-M missile defense position (and will store combat-ready missiles with already deployed nuclear warheads). Another facility should be located close to the airport where the carrier aircraft will be stationed. Otherwise, it would be difficult to talk about any urgency in the possible combat use of tactical nuclear weapons.
A special facility for the storage of nuclear warheads is a capital building in which all the necessary conditions for the storage of nuclear warheads must be created. First of all, it is necessary to provide suitable temperature and humidity conditions.
Special requirements are introduced for the protection and defense of special structures in which special ammunition is located. For these purposes, a guard is allocated, that is, a specially appointed armed unit to perform the combat task of guarding and defending this particularly important object. In addition to security posts, the protection of the facility is often enhanced by several rows of barbed wire, inconspicuous barriers, control strips and various security and signaling technical means, from video surveillance to motion sensors. The right of access to the facility has a very limited circle of people accepted and approved by the relevant authorities.
Since special facilities in Belarus will be located near the zone of special military operations, it is quite possible that additional security measures will be taken. In particular, tanks can be used as long-term firing points and approaches to the structure can be mined.
In the case of the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of Belarus, it will also have to be transported there, and to prtb – mobile repair and technical bases. This is the use of nuclear weapons in combat (for example, RBR or bomber regiments). Organizationally, the PTB is part of the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.
That is, in general, in connection with the possible deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, a huge amount of both organizational and purely engineering and construction (reinforcement) work will have to be solved.
Finally, a few words should probably be said about another very, very important problem. If tactical nuclear weapons are deployed on Belarusian territory (an ally though still another state), there should be a possibility of losing special ammunition or even hypothetically confiscating nuclear warheads by any third party. completely excluded. In other words, the leadership of the republic should firmly guarantee that in the historically foreseeable period (and this question should be asked precisely in this way), with special ammunition on the territory of Belarus, no emergency will occur, even by definition. Otherwise, if the situation starts to develop according to an unpredictable and unfavorable scenario, the results may be unpredictable.
For example, in the second half of the 1980s, the political situation in still Soviet Transcaucasia began to develop in a variant that was dangerous for the safety of nuclear warheads. More precisely, the first signs that the situation might get out of control have just appeared. And in this regard, the relevant authorities, in particular the representatives of the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, decided (without waiting for the aggravation of the relevant events) – the immediate and most urgent removal of nuclear weapons from Transcaucasia. airplanes, helicopters, vehicles – with everything possible in a given situation. As a result, not a single special ammunition fell into the hands of the extremists.
This experience should not be forgotten.
The opinion of the author may not coincide with the opinion of the editors.
Author biography:
Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a military observer of socialbites.ca, a retired colonel.
Graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-aircraft Missile School (1976),
Air Defense Military Command Academy (1986).
Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile battalion (1980–1983).
Deputy commander of an anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986–1988).
Senior officer of the Main Staff of the Air Defense Forces (1988–1992).
Chief of the General Staff Main Operations Directorate (1992–2000).
Graduate of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (1998).
Columnist for Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2000–2003), editor-in-chief of the Military Industrial Courier newspaper (2010–2015).