Russia has always responded to the suffering of its peaceful Iraqi (and Serbian) citizens, but the interests of their country’s national security are still closer. As the anniversaries of both operations approached, Russian politicians and political scientists talked a lot about how chaos reigned in Iraq as a result of long (according to them, ongoing) hostilities. They remembered the losses among the civilian population of this country, and these are hundreds of thousands of people. There was also a lot of talk about the guerrilla and civil wars that broke out in Iraq as a result of the American occupation.
Political scientists studying Operation Allied Force focused mainly on the fact that parts of Yugoslavia were exposed to radioactive contamination during air raids (as a result of the use of depleted uranium munitions). The killing, disappearance, and injury of thousands of Serbs was hotly debated, and ethnic cleansing began in Kosovo province against the nominal nation. Finally, they recalled the problem of increasing carcinogenic diseases among the Serbian population after the use of depleted uranium ammunition. Of course, they did not forget about the destruction of the Yugoslav rivers by the offensive NATO bloc and the poisoning of the air.
In general, in both cases, the attention of the political class and representatives of the political science community focused mainly on the colorful depiction of the bloody teeth of US imperialism and the sharp claws of European hegemonism.
Quite naturally, a simple question arises – and in general, for whom is all this said? For a Western audience, this is frankly a pointless and useless exercise. They just don’t hear it all. And the expression with a tear in your voice will not help in this matter at all.
If such political literacy classes are aimed at native audiences, then they generally need not be convinced of this.
There are question marks about the qualifications of those who enumerate such facts. More precisely, we can boldly say that no special training, special knowledge, and in-depth analysis of the military-political situation are required to initiate such discussions.
The usefulness of such reasoning is also questionable. In a word, how and under what conditions can all this serve Russia. Most likely, the outcome of stories about the horrors of American imperialism is rapidly approaching this indicator, if not equal to zero.
Therefore, the emphasis in the definition of wars and armed conflicts, including (probably first of all) by representatives of the political class and the political science community, should be transferred to completely different areas and directions.
Let’s give some examples.
For example, for the first time in the NATO operation against Yugoslavia (“Allied Force”), strategic bombers of the new generation B-2A “Spirit” were used in real combat conditions. Among such combat vehicles, the new GBU-31 JDAM guided bombs (904 kg weight) with a guidance system adjusted according to Navstar data were also used for the first time.
It’s been 24 years. During this period, neither the B-2A analogue nor the GBU-31 JDAM type bombs appeared in Russia. At the same time, the US military-industrial complex prepared a replacement for the B-2A “Spirit” – the promising strategic bomber B-21 “Raider”, which will equip the US Air Force. The Raider is on its way and the car is about to make its maiden flight. In Russia, most likely, a full-size model of a promising long-range aviation complex has not yet been made. All this time in our country they were mostly discussing the suffering of the Yugoslav people.
Or, for example, to control the ground situation on the eve of Operation Iraqi Freedom, by mid-January 2003, a group of five E-8C radar reconnaissance and control aircraft of the JSTARS system was created in the crisis zone.
Twenty years have passed. In Russia, on the VKS, even on the first approach, there is nothing resembling an E-8C aircraft. And during that time, we talked a lot (and continues to be published with enviable regularity) about the unification of Iraq and the civil war in that country.
Or, it was precisely in the 2003 Iraq campaign that the Pentagon set out to build a global information network and implement a new kind of armed struggle – network-centric wars – technologies. It would probably be an exaggeration to say that we have been successful in this area.
There are dozens or hundreds of similar examples. Of course, it can be noted right away that such concerns are only the fate of experts, representatives of the military expert community and interested parties. But this is a nationwide affair – and the Bolshoi Theater ensemble of violinists, the Tretyakov Gallery team and employees of the State Historical Museum.
Since the question in the current situation is more than acute – there will be a promising strategic bomber in Russia, there will be a gallery. It will not be an instrument of war, it will not be a community. Today, there is the survival of the state and the people on the agenda. And the volume of light conversations on this topic should most likely be reduced as much as possible.
The opinion of the author may not coincide with the opinion of the editors.
Author biography:
Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a military observer of socialbites.ca, a retired colonel.
Graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-aircraft Missile School (1976),
Air Defense Military Command Academy (1986).
Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile battalion (1980–1983).
Deputy commander of an anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986–1988).
Senior officer of the Main Staff of the Air Defense Forces (1988–1992).
Chief of the General Staff Main Operations Directorate (1992–2000).
Graduate of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (1998).
Columnist for Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2000–2003), editor-in-chief of the Military Industrial Courier newspaper (2010–2015).