Western experts indicate at least four possible directions of attack by the RF Armed Forces – from the Kremennaya-Svatovo region to Liman-Kupyansk, from Bakhmut to the outer bypass of the generally fortified Slavyansk-Kramatorsk region access direction Ugledar and finally in the Zaporozhye direction.
The coming weeks are called both decisive and decisive in the West. At the same time, despite all the noise in the Western media, there has not yet been any visible movement of troops (forces) in any direction of the alleged attacks of the RF Armed Forces.
There is evidence of light advance of units and formations north of Bakhmut, the sailors took more advantageous positions in the Ugledar area, local battles are being fought in the Zaporozhye direction. So, it seems a little early for now to say that some events that can be described as “decisive” and “decisive” took place during special military operations.
It is worth remembering that, according to the canons of Russian military art, the average rate of advance of troops in an offensive (counter-offensive) operation is up to 20 km per day. Nothing like this has ever been observed on the contact line.
Much has been said recently about a possible attack by a joint grouping of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus from this province. At the same time, the impression remains that over the past year, Alexander Lukashenko will do everything possible (or even impossible) to avoid participating in a special military operation. In addition, the grouping of troops (forces) deployed on the territory of Belarus is clearly insufficient to conduct an offensive operation on an operational-strategic scale. To solve such problems, the combat and numerical strength of the troops must be increased by at least an order of magnitude.
Again, there are no signs that strike troops are being formed on the territory of Belarus and stockpiles of necessary supplies are concentrated, which can easily be revealed through the space intelligence of the collective West. In addition, during the actions of the troops in this direction, any principle of surprise is completely excluded, and the fortification equipment of the region, conducted by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, assumes extremely stubborn battles when the allied forces will have to conduct. Breaking the defenses on Ukraine’s northern borders. To do this, at least several engineer-sapper brigades and assault and barrage brigades must be present in the combat composition of the troops.
It should be noted that in the near future two conditions will have the most significant impact on the actions of troops on both sides during a special military operation.
Firstly, in a month comes an astronomical spring, and in the southern regions of Ukraine there may be a mudslide that will significantly complicate all troop movements, and in some cases make them possible only on paved roads.
Secondly, in March-April, the Armed Forces of Ukraine will receive regular military aid packages (including modern Western-style armored vehicles), which will significantly increase the combat and operational capabilities of the Ukrainian army. Apparently, the Russian leadership does not intend to wait for a qualitative improvement in the Armed Forces of Ukraine and in this regard will solve the tasks set in the near future.
However, it should be remembered that the enemy will not fall asleep and dutifully wait for the attacks of the Russian troops. First of all, it should be said that the Ukrainian army is not yet fully ready for actions of an operational-strategic scope. For this, the Armed Forces of Ukraine does not have enough strength and means. However, it is quite possible that the Ukrainian armed forces will launch a counterattack at the operational-tactical level. It cannot be ruled out that the plans of the Ukrainian command (initiative and insidious, it should be noted) have such plans. It is quite possible that a successful Ukrainian counteroffensive will not lead to any significant military consequences, but the military-political consequences of such an action will be much more significant.
Recently, there has been more and more information that the Russian Aerospace Forces will begin to attack bridges, tunnels and transit areas on the Polish border used by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the near future. Some former generals call for massive strategic air strikes against these targets.
However, the Russian Aerospace Forces do not have strategic aviation. The Aerospace Forces has a branch – Long Range Aviation. It includes strategic bombers such as the Tu-95 and Tu-160, but is not designed to attack with free-falling bombs. Such aircraft use only air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) during combat operations, and for the destruction of the same bridges, guided aircraft guns with a caliber of 1,500 kg or more are preferred. The power of the ALCM warhead is clearly not enough to solve such problems.
As for mass strikes (such), they are delivered only within the framework of operational formations. That is, one can speak of a major strike only if delivered by the entire air army (everything below (corps, division) is already a group attack). There is no air army in the Long-Range Aviation of the Aerospace Forces of the Russian Federation. The DA is currently represented in the VKS of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation only by command. Therefore, by definition, long-range aviation cannot carry out a massive attack.
Long-range bombers of the Tu-22M3 type can be involved in attacks on infrastructure facilities. However, the airspace over Ukraine is a controversial area. The Russian Aerospace Forces currently do not have air superiority. In order to send the heavy and low-maneuverable Tu-22M3 formations to the Ukrainian sky, it is necessary to either destroy all active air defense systems or suppress them with electronic warfare to a degree that prevents the combat use of the air. defense systems / air defense systems become impossible. To do this, the Tu-22M3 units should include electronic warfare aircraft, which in terms of speed and flight altitude correspond to this type of bomber. However, there is no electronic warfare aircraft in Long Range Aviation.
For these reasons, the Aerospace Forces Command refrains from using Tu-22M3 long-range bombers over Ukraine;
Theoretically, the task of destroying infrastructure facilities could be carried out by MiG-31K aircraft with Kinzhal missiles. The whole question is that the number of such missiles should reach a certain operational level (at least hundreds of units), that is, attacks in this case should not take the character of a single impact.
Finally, much has been said lately about possible attacks against orbital groups of potential partners. Technically, this is possible, there are already prototypes of the promising Nudol missile defense system and the S-500 Prometheus air defense system. But again, anti-satellite combat vehicles currently have no operational significance. Since there are about 2,000 of the same Starlink spacecraft currently in Earth orbits, launching several satellite fighters will not solve the problem.
The situation with the destruction of satellites in geostationary orbits is even more difficult. To defeat such a spacecraft, it would be necessary to launch a Soyuz-size carrier rocket with an upper stage. It is clear that there is no need to consider any mass character in terms of such actions.
At the same time, it should be noted that the results of such steps are difficult to predict. Without exaggeration, an attack on the space assets of leading Western states could result in a major war.
As for the general development of the military-political situation, it changes so dramatically that in a fairly short time all predictions and assumptions can become either outdated or untenable.
The opinion of the author may not coincide with the opinion of the editors.
Author biography:
Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a military observer of socialbites.ca, a retired colonel.
Graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-aircraft Missile School (1976),
Air Defense Military Command Academy (1986).
Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile battalion (1980–1983).
Deputy commander of an anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986–1988).
Senior officer of the Main Staff of the Air Defense Forces (1988–1992).
Chief of the General Staff Main Operations Directorate (1992–2000).
Graduate of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (1998).
Columnist for Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2000–2003), editor-in-chief of the Military Industrial Courier newspaper (2010–2015).