Along with the increase in the size of the army, the Ministry of Defense plans to create the Moscow and Leningrad military districts, reorganize three motorized rifle divisions, one army unit in Karelia, two air assault divisions, seven motorized rifle brigades. It forms five naval divisions on the basis of divisions and existing naval brigades.
In addition, each combined armed (tank) army should be given a mixed aviation division and an army aviation brigade of 80-100 combat helicopters. In addition, also to create three aviation division directorates, eight bomber regiments, one fighter aviation regiment and six army aviation brigades.
Five artillery divisions as well as high-capacity artillery brigades will be formed in the Rocket Forces and Artillery (the number of brigades is not specified).
The plans are impressive, but the main thing is not to mechanically repeat the organizational and personnel structures of Soviet and modern times, but to reach a completely new level in intelligence, management and communication. Significant changes are also needed in the service structure and combat weapons of the Armed Forces. It is important not to prepare for the last war, but to plan actions taking into account the prospects of at least 40-50 years.
For example, the plans of the military department of each combined armed (tank) army to issue a mixed aviation division and an army aviation brigade consisting of 80-100 combat helicopters cause some surprise. This happened already before the Great Patriotic War and in its first period (with the exception of the army aviation brigade, since there were no helicopters at that time).
In those days aviation divisions were indeed subordinate to the combined armed armies. For example, on the eve of June 22, 1941, the 3rd combined arms army of the Western Special Military District included the 11th mixed aviation division and the 7th air brigade, and the 10th army of the same district, the 9th mixed aviation division ( SAD) . In particular, the 9th SAD had 429 aircraft. It’s an absolutely incredible number for an air division that is both then and even more so today.
But the war showed that the distribution of aviation among the operational formations of the Ground Forces was an extremely erroneous decision. In this regard, the Commander of the Airborne Forces of the Red Army Pavel Zhigarev informed Stalin on March 15, 1942 that the Red Army Air Force lacked organizational unity and unified command for a successful fight against the enemy.
“The repelling of aviation leads to the delivery of strikes everywhere, but because of this they are all weak.
The air force should be desubordinated to the armies and fronts, reduced to large organizational units directly subordinate to the commander of the Red Army Air Force, who will receive duties directly from the Headquarters, who will manage all the aviation of the country, ”the author wrote. General Zhigarev.
Therefore, it is quite possible to consider the re-creation of operational formations in the Aerospace Forces (or at least experimentally in an air army), which is directly subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the Aerospace Forces. The practice of subordinating aviation to various commands does not justify itself. The air force must be united and indivisible. The same goes for army aviation. This will make it possible to gather forces in the direction of the main attacks and solve the main tasks in the armed conflict.
As for the formation of the five artillery divisions, it should be assumed that the organization and staff structure of the future formations should fully comply with the requirements of the new century. This also applies to the availability of modern means of reconnaissance and fire adjustment and the possibility of receiving data from space reconnaissance systems in real time, as well as the presence of a squadron of unmanned aerial vehicles in the artillery department. The important thing (no matter how trite this requirement may seem) is that artillery formations should be equipped with modern weapons that outperform comparable Western weapons in firing range, accuracy and fire performance. The command post of an artillery division must be equipped with an automatic fire control system, which makes it possible to solve all possible (and suddenly arising) tasks of attacking the enemy with fire in a matter of seconds.
As for the creation of two more air assault divisions, such a plan should be considered beyond critical. The time of paratroopers has long passed – and this is a completely obvious fact.
And modern Russian airborne and airborne assault divisions, equipped with aluminum combat vehicles and 122-mm howitzers of the 1960 model, are hardly useful for solving any important combat mission.
It is of course possible to reorganize the existing naval brigades into five divisions. However, it should be noted that for these formations in such a situation it is necessary to have suitable amphibious landing forces and landing craft. Without it, sailors are no longer exactly sailors.
Finally, the plans of the military department to increase the size of the RF Armed Forces say almost nothing about the air defense forces and their means. But in the European part of the country, the combat and strength of units and formations of the radio engineering and anti-aircraft missile forces should be sharply strengthened from time to time.
In conclusion, it should be noted that there is still a lot of work to be done on the operational equipment of possible areas of military operations. This includes the development of a transport communication system, the creation of a base system for aviation and fleet (development of an airspace network, equipping airfields, equipping permanent and maneuverable base points for the Navy), construction of command posts, arsenals, bases, stockpiles of supplies. construction of warehouses for storage and much more.
In general, it seems appropriate to clarify (perhaps additional work) detailed plans to increase the size of the Armed Forces to 1.5 million people.
The opinion of the author may not coincide with the opinion of the editors.