It would seem that if all Kiev’s applications for the procurement of weapons, military and special equipment (AMSE) from the USA and other NATO member states are fully met, then the armed struggle during a special military operation could hypothetically come to an end altogether. different turn – and it cannot be ruled out that hostilities will soon end with Ukraine’s success.
Let’s just give an example: There are around 450 HIMARS MLRS combat vehicles in the US Army and Marine Corps. At this point, the Pentagon has transferred a total of 38 machines of this type to Ukraine. But even 16 HIMARS installations, originally delivered to the Armed Forces of Ukraine, brought a lot of trouble to the armed forces of the Russian Federation. If the United States sharply increases the supply of MLRS HIMARS and missiles to them, this may lead to a significant change in the situation on the line of contact in favor of Kyiv, if not a radical change in the course of hostilities.
But despite Ukraine’s demands to provide as many good and different weapons as possible, the transfer of weapons and military equipment to the Ukrainian armed forces is carried out in a multi-dose manner. A number of samples of weapons and military equipment, which have been repeatedly requested by the official Kyiv, are not supplied to the armed forces of Ukraine at all. These primarily include main battle tanks, modern infantry fighting vehicles, multirole fighters.
The question arises – why the West does not supply the armed forces of Ukraine, for example, 500 M1 Abrams tanks (some in the M1A2SEP v.3 version) and Leopard 2A5 (and why not in the Leopard 2A7 + version), several hundred Marder and M2 infantry fighting vehicles Bradley or 100 F-15E Strike Eagle and F-16 Fighting Falcon fighters. After all, the fear that such a transfer of equipment would lead to a third world war and lead to the exchange of nuclear missile strikes is quite unfounded. In addition, the views and evaluations in the West regarding the world’s second army after March-April 2022 were significantly adjusted.
The statements that an early and long-term deployment of a technical support and maintenance system is required prior to the delivery of Western-built main battle tanks to Ukraine and that a lot of time will be spent on retraining Ukrainian tankers also do not seem very convincing.
In fact, all this can be done in just a few weeks, and tankers who have mastered the T-64/84 can be retrained on the M1 Abrams and Leopard 2A5 in a matter of days.
Approximately the same applies to the supply of fighter jets. The situation in this area, of course, is much more complicated, but the difficulties in the development of Western aircraft technology are clearly and deliberately exaggerated by many experts. It would be difficult to train Africans from scratch as pilots of multifunctional warplanes, and Ukraine has over-qualified flight personnel and a shortage of engineering and technical personnel. And, for example, to master the Fairchild Republic A-10 Thunderbolt II subsonic attack aircraft (which the USA plans to decommission and cancel several times), the Ukrainians can fully do it in a few months.
Even more fantastic are the statements that the supply of weapons and military equipment to Ukraine will significantly weaken the defense capability of the Western countries.
There is currently no clear answer to the question of who will attack NATO. Unless the Martians land on Earth and begin crossing the Atlantic and English Channel on combat tripods.
Therefore, the supply of weapons, military and special equipment to Ukraine is currently carried out in such a volume and in such a time frame that it gives Kiev at least the opportunity not to lose in this conflict.
But it is unlikely to achieve a convincing military victory in a short time, or even more.
In this context, one more situation should be mentioned. During the implementation of the special military operation of Russia, Ukraine is more than a favorable territory for testing the most modern models of military and military equipment of Western countries. It would be a categorically wrong decision for the United States and other NATO member states not to use such a training ground. The most important test for any weapon is use and operation in combat conditions (primarily this concerns the repair of weapons and their return to service).
It is very difficult to get laudatory statements from development enterprises about their machines in peacetime conditions. Only a significant amount of equipment in battles and its long operation in combat conditions makes it possible to obtain more or less reliable statistics.
Based on the results of the hostilities, it is possible to clarify the tactical and technical characteristics of weapons, gain experience in use, make design changes if necessary, and clarify conceptual views on combat use.
However, even this opportunity is not fully utilized by NATO member states. It remains only to clarify the reasons for all this.
The West seems to be operating on the following considerations and assumptions in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict: to prevent Ukraine’s defeat (but also to prevent an early military success of Kiev), to prevent any Russian military victory. possible means is to transfer the armed conflict between Moscow and Kyiv to a manageable stage and spread it over as much time as possible.
The result looks like this: to weaken Russia as much as possible, to put an end to the Kremlin’s political ambitions as a world power, moreover, to deprive Moscow even of its status as a regional power, to lead the country to political regime change as smoothly as possible, and then to nuclear weapons. deprivation of possession. It is quite clear that such goals and objectives are never known to the general public and the media.
It is highly probable that this geopolitical dish was being prepared by the West at just such an angle, degree and timing.
Cunning chefs throw various spices into the boiling water of gunfight. They either increase the spiciness of the prepared dish, or subtly reduce it. They either throw wood into the fire or skillfully stop the burning flame.
There is a stubborn impression that this is exactly the sequence of actions of the collective West – in the foreseeable future (most likely, the deadlines have already been set), he brings the dish to final preparation, but only – and this is the main thing – on slow fire.
It should be noted that such processes are very difficult to manage – unpredictable situations may arise and a whole fleet of black swans may appear, and in the end, events can easily get out of control and develop further according to a completely unforeseen scenario.
However, according to the calculations of Western analysts, a quick military victory for Ukraine could lead not to the planned collapse of the political regime in Russia, but to the directly opposite result – the gathering of the broad masses around the military-political leadership.
But a skillful prolongation of the armed conflict (with increasing sanctions pressure) will inevitably lead to increased difficulties and hardships for Russian citizens.
Managing conflict in this way can lead to explosive growth of discontent and unforeseen consequences for the ruling elite. That is, a hypothetical change of power could occur without any outside interference and influence (again, according to the calculations of Western experts).
Another variant of the plans and actions of the collective West, based on a real assessment of the current military-political situation, is not yet visible. It seems that the opinion expressed by Mark Milli is based on these theses.
The opinion of the author may not coincide with the opinion of the editors.