Spain questioned the plan to join an international naval mission the United States wanted to pursue against Yemeni rebels in the Red Sea. Paris resisted placing its ships under Washington’s command and defended its vessels in the Red Sea from attacks by Houthi militias. Rome faced a similar situation. Although the White House initially named Spain, France, and Italy among the participants, the three Western allies signaled reluctance. Traditional partners in the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia, were not eager to contribute either. The motive behind this hesitance remains a topic of debate.
Experts point to several plausible explanations given the sparse official detail. There is broad agreement that Joe Biden’s administration is backing Israel politically and militarily in its Gaza operations. Positioning ships alongside American assets would appear risky and incongruent. Israel leads a punitive campaign in Gaza that has resulted in a high number of civilian casualties. Many governments worry about appearing as if they are directly coordinating in a joint mission while those operations unfold. Mediterranean states, in particular, weigh the political optics carefully.
Speaking to this newspaper, a Yemen expert notes that Spain did not join the Red Sea operation for consistency’s sake. Pressuring Israel over Gaza while taking part in a Washington-led mission would send a confusing message. The analyst suggests Spain’s best role today is that of a mediator, given its credibility in Arab circles.
Reuters reports that public anger over Israel’s Gaza campaign also influences leaders’ willingness to participate. A YouGov survey cited by the agency found that a large majority of Western Europeans, especially in Spain and Italy, think Israel should halt its assault on the Strip.
David Hernández, a professor of International Relations at Complutense University, says European governments worry about the political costs. Some voters oppose their governments’ involvement in such missions, underscoring the delicate balancing act on the table.
A risky mission
The U.S. administration has voiced concern about the dangers inherent in the mission. Yemeni rebels have attacked or hijacked a number of ships near Bab el-Mandeb Strait since late November in solidarity with Gaza.
A security analyst notes that while there is a desire to avoid appearing anti-Israel or anti-American, maintaining a credible chain of command may require sending ships equipped with anti-aircraft defenses. The discussion centers on the types of ships needed to deter drone and missile threats, especially from the Houthis.
Spain’s stance aligns with its broader EU posture, which has already limited the Atalanta mission that extends to the Red Sea. The operation, originally focused on piracy in the Indian Ocean, has raised questions about capabilities and readiness. Spain contributes older frigates that lack robust anti-air defenses, a factor critics say is essential if the fleet is to withstand drone or missile strikes.
On 26 October, the frigate Victoria took over from Navarra on this mission. These are Santa María class ships from the 1980s, armed with a 76 mm gun, two 25 mm close-range guns, machine guns, and a reconnaissance helicopter. Analysts note that these ships were designed for counter-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa, not for high-intensity theater warfare. Yemeni drones and Iranian-supplied missiles—types seen in recent attacks—could reach critical ranges around the Gulf of Aden and into parts of the Red Sea.
The argument for a more capable fleet is clear. Analysts suggest deploying frigates with stronger air-defense systems. Five Álvaro de Bazán-class F-100 ships, with long-range radar and defensive missiles, would significantly bolster protection. Yet most of Spain’s modern fleet is older than 15 years and requires updates, delaying any real upgrade of capabilities.
These considerations echo comments from the country’s leader, who emphasized that Brussels should not expand the Atalanta mission in its current form. The aim, he argued, is to manage risk with a framework that suits the evolving security environment, noting that the nature of the challenge differs from past undertakings.
The president did not rule out or confirm participation in a separate Red Sea operation not tied to Atalanta. He stated that Spain would not oppose a new initiative, provided it is conducted under NATO or EU auspices. Talks with the U.S. president did not change the tone of the discourse or the substance of the position.
Allies remain committed to Biden’s power
On 19 December, a White House statement described a multinational effort involving twenty countries and major shipping and energy interests to safeguard Red Sea navigation after BP halted its use of the Suez route. The plan envisions surrounding Africa, with a ten-day horizon for the operation and a toll that would escalate costs for global maritime traffic that accounts for a significant share of world commerce.
Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin asked for a coalition that would include the United Kingdom, Bahrain, Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Seychelles, and Spain to carry out Operation Prosperity Guardian.
Spain promptly rejected direct participation outside the NATO or EU framework. Italy issued a similar statement, signaling ships would be sent only if merchant interests required it, and not under U.S. command. France confirmed support for secure navigation in the Red Sea, but stated its ships would operate under French command. One vessel has already shot down a Yemeni attack aircraft.
At present, twelve of the twenty named nations have confirmed involvement. The United Kingdom and Greece have publicly aligned with the mission, while others like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have expressed no interest in joining.