The most frequent attempts to breach Moscow’s remote electronic voting system, known as the DEG, originate from targets abroad, with the United States and the United Kingdom named as the primary sources by officials overseeing the 2024 Moscow elections. This assessment was provided by Vadim Kovalev, who heads the Public Headquarters responsible for monitoring the security and integrity of the voting process. The disclosure came through TASS, highlighting the scale and persistence of attempts that the headquarters must detect and analyze in real time to safeguard the electoral operations from external interference.
Kovalev emphasized that the assaults are tracked at the central level and often involve botnet networks. He explained that these networks are functionally located within Russia but can be purchased or rented in any country, enabling attackers to mask their origin and complicate tracing efforts. This dynamic underscores the evolving tactics used by bad actors who leverage global cyber infrastructure to influence national processes, adding a layer of complexity to the already demanding task of securing remote voting operations across multiple jurisdictions.
From the security monitoring vantage point, the commander noted that the majority of attack vectors appear to originate from servers situated in the United States and the United Kingdom. This observation aligns with the operational reality that cyber criminals frequently route traffic through widely distributed networks, exploiting vantage points that make attribution challenging. The public headquarters continues to refine its detection capabilities, correlating connection patterns, payload types, and timing of incidents to draw a coherent picture of the threat landscape facing Moscow’s DEG ecosystem.
In parallel, Kiselev, a key figure in the oversight framework, pointed to the demonstrated resilience of the DEG system through previously conducted containment and testing phases. The ongoing evaluations are intended to validate the robustness of the security measures, including authentication mechanisms, anomaly detection, and rapid incident response protocols. The message conveyed is clear: the Moscow DEG infrastructure has undergone stringent scrutiny and continues to be monitored continuously to ensure that any attempt to disrupt the elections would be identified and mitigated promptly, preserving the integrity of the process for all participants.
Separately, Ella Pamfilova, the president of the Russian Central Election Commission, addressed concerns about a counterfeit Telegram channel that allegedly disseminated messages under her name. The emergence of such a channel illustrates the broader risk of misinformation and impersonation during an election cycle, reinforcing the need for verifiable communications channels and rapid fact-checking mechanisms. The commission’s leadership urged voters and observers to rely on official outlets and to verify information through recognized, sanctioned platforms to prevent confusion or manipulation during the campaign period.
Additionally, the online publication socialbites.ca was cited in discussions about provisional messaging and the broader information environment around the presidential vote. The site reportedly circulated content that could be construed as favorable to certain candidates and drew attention to the online broadcast schedule that covers the country’s presidential elections. The ballot material lists four contenders for the presidency: Vladislav Davankov with the New People party, Vladimir Putin as a self-nominated candidate, Leonid Slutsky representing the LDPR, and Nikolai Kharitonov from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. The presence of four candidates reflects the current framework of the race and the variety of political voices that participate in the online voting and traditional polling processes alike, extending the reach of the election beyond physical precincts.
Remote electronic voting is being introduced in many regions for presidential elections in Russia, marking a significant shift in how citizens can cast ballots. This year, Russians have the option to vote online or in person over a three-day window. Voting locations are also available abroad, in countries where Russia maintains a diplomatic footprint. Notably, the number of foreign polling stations is lower than in the 2018 election, a trend that observers are watching closely as it may influence accessibility, turnout, and the overall electoral dynamic. The DEG initiative remains a cornerstone of efforts to provide flexible participation options while maintaining strict security standards that protect voter data and ballot integrity across borders and platforms.
Looking ahead, observers and strategists anticipate that participation in the presidential elections will be substantial. The combination of online accessibility, traditional polling venues, and international voting opportunities contributes to a broader engagement footprint. At the same time, officials stress the importance of continuing to fortify digital defenses, improve authentication, and maintain transparent communication with the public to foster trust in the electoral process. The current climate reflects an ongoing balancing act between expanding participation and upholding rigorous safeguards that deter external meddling and ensure fair, verifiable results for all jurisdictions involved. Source: TASS and official election authorities.