A consortium of hackers identified as Team Jorge, reportedly rooted in Israel, has been accused of meddling in election campaigns across more than 30 nations. This claim is documented by Israeli media outlets, including Haaretz, which describe the group and its leadership based on detailed testimony from Tal Hanan, who is said to be a former special forces operative turned criminal operator. The allegations center on the group’s alleged ability to influence political outcomes by covert means and on the way such operations were conducted, raising serious questions about the integrity of electoral processes worldwide.
The core narrative presented by the reporting suggests that the crew did not limit itself to theoretical or theoretical-fueled chatter, but actively engaged in real-world interference, including at least one presidential race thought to have been affected by their activities. The scope of the alleged operations encompasses multiple campaigns, hinting at a modus operandi that prioritizes strategic timing and message manipulation to tilt public perception in favor of certain candidates or agendas. These claims imply a systematic approach that extends beyond isolated incidents, painting a pattern of persistent interference across different political contexts.
According to the media accounts, investigators or journalists who contacted the hackers posed as potential clients, seeking social media influence services. In responses attributed to Hanan, the group presented itself as a service provider to intelligence agencies, political parties, and private entities seeking covert manipulation of public opinion. A central part of their claimed infrastructure, as described by the sources, was the deployment of thousands of fictitious social media accounts designed to create and amplify narratives, seed confusion, and simulate broad public support or opposition around targeted issues and candidates.
Hanan is quoted as saying that the group had run operations across 33 presidential campaigns, with 27 of those efforts reportedly yielding success. The assertions portray a high-output operation that leverages scalable digital assets, coordinated messaging, and rapid response within crowded online ecosystems. While the veracity of every detail remains a matter of corroboration, the interview highlights how a network of operators could coordinate across borders to influence political discourse in subtle but meaningful ways, including the shaping of media narratives and the amplification of specific political viewpoints.
The narrative further indicates that the group remains active in current electoral cycles beyond the region initially described. Attributions point to ongoing involvement in certain electoral environments in Africa, while the organization is said to have established teams in other regions, including parts of Europe and the Middle East. These claims imply a broad international footprint and the possibility of a persistent, cross-border strategy that adapts to local political tempos and regulatory environments. The unfolding account raises concerns about accountability, transparency, and the safeguards that democracies rely on to prevent foreign or covert influence over domestic elections.
The broader context of these allegations includes references to other hacker collectives believed to engage in politically motivated cyber operations. For instance, separate actions attributed to KillNet, a group associated with Russian-speaking actors, are described as having launched significant cyber activity in response to policy decisions in Europe. The reports recount a sequence of actions framed as retaliatory steps linked to strategic decisions, including weaponry or defense policy shifts in relation to Ukraine. These associations illustrate a landscape where irregular cyber activity intersects with international politics, raising urgent questions about how nations respond to cyber threats and how public confidence in electoral integrity can be safeguarded against such disruptive maneuvers.